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I. BACKGROUND
The Framers, acutely aware of settlers' experiences with religious
intolerance in England and the colonies, established a republic in which
religious freedom would be shielded from governmental interference or
intrusion.' The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution embodies this philosophical promise and pragmatic guaran-
tee, declaring that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; J.D., The George
Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. My
thanks to Seval Yildirim for her critical guidance; Bahar Ansari, Art Minas, Tyler McCormick,
and Douglas Spoerl, for their invaluable research assistance in preparing Appendix B; the staff of
the law review, including Emily Horowitz and Tal Lifshitz, for improving the quality and
readability of this piece; and my parents for their encouragement and support. Please excuse any
errors, which rest with and should be attributed to me.
1. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) ("historical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance . . . gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause" of
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976)
("Intolerable persecutions throughout history led to the Framers' firm determination that religious
worship both in method and belief must be strictly protected from government intervention.") (per
curiam).
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exercise of [religion.]" 2
The Supreme Court repeatedly has understood the special origins of
this substantive right and the unique role that religious freedom has in
our constitutional tradition and social fabric. Justice Robert H. Jackson
noted that "[tjhe history of religious persecution" explains why "the
First Amendment separately mention[s] free exercise of religion."' Else-
where, the Court observed that "[t]he place of religion in our society is
an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on
the . . . inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have
come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the
power of the government to invade that citadel[.]"'
Religious freedom, while robust, is not without limits. The First
Amendment "embraces two concepts, [the] freedom to believe and [the]
freedom to act."' Whereas the first is "absolute," 6 the second "is not."7
As to the former, in his seminal text, A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the most influential and persuasive
advocate of religious liberty among the founding generation,' stated that
"[t]he opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under
its jurisdiction."9
With respect to acts, by contrast, individual religious conduct may
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This requirement applies to the States. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991) ("[The free exercise clause was paradigmatically
about citizen rights, not state rights; it thus invites incorporation.").
3. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
4. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the
continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the religious liberty
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . ."); James Madison, Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment (1785), available at http://religiousfreedom.
lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison-m&r-I 785.html (objecting to the use of "Religion as an engine of
Civil policy").
5. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
6. Id.; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) ("This Court has
long held the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be an absolute prohibition against
governmental regulation of religious beliefs.").
7. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304; see also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603 ("[T]he Free
Exercise Clause provides substantial," but not total, "protection for lawful conduct grounded in
religious belief.").
8. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1431 (1990) ("Jefferson's bill ... was one of the
major precursors of the religion clauses of the first amendment. Four of the five states used
language from Jefferson's bill in their proposals for a religion amendment."); id. at 1451 ("It was
in reliance on Jefferson that the Supreme Court later held that there can be no free exercise right to
exemption from a generally applicable law when such laws are directed at actions and not
opinions.") (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
9. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 976 (1900)); see also Madison,
924 [Vol. 66:923
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not only conflict with, but under certain circumstances must give way to,
countervailing state interests.'o Indeed, the Supreme Court "has rejected
challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of
certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles," where
"the conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace, or order."" For example, the Court
has upheld state limitations on religious freedom where individuals
claimed the right to deny a child a compulsory vaccination for commu-
nicable disease,' 2 to participate in a plural relationship,' 3 or to engage in
polygamy.' 4 The Court also has held that individual religious expression
must cede to state interests in "eradicating racial discrimination in edu-
cation,"" preserving "the fiscal vitality of the social security system,"l6
and maintaining a "fair, evenhanded, and uniform" conscription system
such that the military has sufficient manpower.1
In the realm of religious expression, as in other areas of individual
rights, "context matters."" This Article concerns the tension between
individual religious expression and state interests in the penal context-
the social space where individual rights generally are at their lowest
ebb.' 9 In particular, this Article explores the extent to which an inmate
supra note 4 ("The Religion ... of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man.").
10. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("The state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[O]nly those interests of the highest
order," such as public order or safety, "can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.").
I1. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citations omitted); see generally Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge
to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 923 (1995) ("Even those who argued
that religious expression must be given a broad gauge, recognized that it could not be absolute. In
an organized society, religious expression, like all other individual acts, must be constrained by
the fundamental needs of social order. This outer limit was generally expressed in terms of
'peace,' 'safety,' and the reciprocal rights of others.").
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
13. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
14. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
15. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
16. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
17. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
18. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 327 (2003)) (reviewing statutory claims that state prison officials failed to accommodate
religious practices).
19. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007) ("the rights afforded prisoners
set a floor for those" available to others), vacated by 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009) (remanding for
consideration of a Supreme Court decision issued subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's ruling); Fred
Cohen, Captives' Legal Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYcHoL. REV. 1, 1 (1993)
(observing that prison inmates "occupy[] the lowest rung on the legal rights ladder"); see also
Garrett Epps, Strip Search for a Minor Offense: Is It Constitutional?, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 13,
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may maintain his or her hair for religious reasons despite prison groom-
ing policies limiting or prohibiting inmates from growing facial hair or
keeping long hair. Prison officials justify such policies on various
grounds, including the need to properly identify inmates, ensure optimal
health and sanitation, eliminate markers of gang affiliation, and promote
order.20
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is among the
federal courts that have issued opinions in this legal field. In challenges
brought by inmates under the Free Exercise Clause or its statutory ana-
logue in the prison context, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"),2 1 the Eleventh Circuit has routinely sided
with prisons and specifically validated the restrictive inmate grooming
policies of states within its jurisdiction-Alabama, Florida, and Geor-
gia.2 2 The court, more specifically, accepts the states' penological inter-
ests as compelling and the restrictive grooming policies as the least
restrictive means to further those interests. Joining the Eleventh Circuit
on the restrictive end of the spectrum are other courts of appeals, most
notably the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth. 23 The federal appellate courts are
not, however, in agreement. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has taken
the opposite position, striking down restrictive grooming policies as an
infringement on inmate religious freedom.24
The legal landscape in this area is not only split, but is facing trans-
formation. The Eleventh Circuit is affected by, and may even lie at the
heart of, this changing dynamic. In 2011, the Department of Justice
intervened in federal circuit and district court cases pending in Alabama,
2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/201I /10/strip-search-for-a-minor-
offense-is-it-constitutional/246581 ("[our] society [is] enamored of incarceration, which aims to
turn any prisoner into an item who can be processed and controlled with minimal fuss about rights
and privacy."). The limited rights of prisoners are discussed in greater detail in Part II.C, infra.
20. See Part 1I.B, infra.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
22. In this Article, "restrictive grooming policies" are generally those policies in prison
facilities that require inmates to shave, trim, or cut their hair without religious exceptions.
23. See DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 153-54 (5th Cir. 2011); Iron Hines v. S.C. Dep't of
Corr., 148 F.3d 353, 357-58 (4th Cir. 1998); Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1990).
24. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005). For a case
demonstrating the courts' historic understanding of the importance of religious exercise and
restrictive inmate grooming standards, see Ho Ah Kow v Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253 (C.C.D. Cal.
1879) ("The maltreatment consisted in having wantonly and maliciously cut off the queue of the
plaintiff, a queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being regarded by them as
degrading and as entailing future suffering."); id. at 254 ("A treatment to which disgrace is
attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against the escape of the prisoner, but
merely to aggravate the severity of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment
additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence of the sentence it is punishment
in addition to that imposed by the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence it is wanton
cruelty.").
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California, and Texas, arguing in favor of the Ninth Circuit's permis-
sive, inmate-rights approach to prisoner challenges to inmate grooming
standards, rather than the Eleventh Circuit's more deferential, prison-
centric take.2 5 The California state prison system, which houses approxi-
mately 144,000 inmates,2 6 ultimately settled its case, deciding generally
to withdraw its restrictive policies and allow inmates to maintain beards
and long hair for religious purposes, notwithstanding institutional needs
for security, health, and order.27
In doing so, California became one of thirty-nine states-along
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the largest prison system with over
208,000 inmates, 28 and the District of Columbia-to adopt permissive
grooming policies or grant religious exemptions to such grooming poli-
cies.2 9 By contrast, the states within the Eleventh Circuit are among the
minority of states, eleven to be exact, which apply restrictive grooming
policies to inmates with religious beliefs requiring long or unshorn
hair.3 0
In this Article, I argue that the Eleventh Circuit's general legal
approach to such religious freedom claims and its support for restrictive
inmate grooming standards are no longer sustainable. That is, a substan-
tial and increasing number of jurisdictions have been able to respond to
their penological concerns-the same penological interests that under-
gird and justify the restrictive inmate grooming standards adopted by the
states within the Eleventh Circuit-without abridging the rights of
inmates to grow their hair in accordance with their respective faiths.
25. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Limbaugh v. Thompson, No. 2:93-
cv1404-WHA (M.D. Ala. Apr. 8, 2011); Complaint in Intervention Pursuant to the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (Civil Rights) at 7, Basra v. Cate, No.
CVII-01676 SVW (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2011); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Garner v. Kennedy, No. 11-40653 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter "Department of Justice
Garner Amicus Brief']. In 2010, the Department of Justice also responded to a request from the
Supreme Court for the Solicitor General's views on whether certiorari should be granted in a case
brought by a Native American inmate who sought to maintain long hair, as his religion required,
despite Texas's restrictive grooming policies. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
7-8, Thunderhorse v. Pierce, No. 09-1353 (S. Ct. Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter "Department of
Justice Thunderhorse Amicus Brief"] (the Fifth Circuit's failure to "requir[e] respondent [prison
director] to address record evidence that tended to show that prison officials potentially could
further compelling governmental interests through less restrictive means" is a "case-specific error
[that] does not [itself] warrant plenary review by this Court."), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 896 (2011).
26. See Jennifer Medina, California Begins Moving Prison Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/us/califomia-begins-moving-
prisoners.html.
27. See Settlement Agreement at I[ 9-10, Basra v. Cate, No. CVI 1-01676 SVW, Doc. #40-1
(C.D. Cal. June 5, 2011) [hereinafter "Basra Settlement"].
28. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON Cour 2010, at 7 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PrisonCount_2010.pdf.
29. See infra Appendix B.
30. See id.
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Accordingly, I posit that the Eleventh Circuit's jurisprudence must not
only be revisited, but replaced with a more searching analysis, in light of
the prevailing, and growing recognition that religious rights of inmates
need not reflexively give way to prison interests in security, health, and
order. Framed differently, to the extent that an individual imprisoned in
a state within the Eleventh Circuit asserts that the applicable grooming
standards implicate an inmate's religious rights, the Eleventh Circuit
may be obliged to change course and examine with greater scrutiny and
skepticism the states' ability under law to enforce restrictive grooming
policies.
I make this argument in three steps. I will first provide an overview
of the constitutional and statutory provisions that are relevant to claims
of religious freedom in the inmate grooming context, specifically the
legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA; the peno-
logical interests that states with restrictive policies invoke to explain the
need for their respective grooming requirements; the scope of individual
religious rights, which are generally limited in the penal environment;
and finally, the role of the courts in assessing prison regulations and
assertions of religious freedom by inmates.
Second, with an understanding of the relevant law and policies, I
will proceed to summarize the rulings issued by the Eleventh Circuit in
this area of law. And third, I discuss the recent developments that partic-
ularly call into question the Eleventh Circuit's deferential stance on the
religious rights of inmates with respect to restrictive grooming policies.
Given this foundation, I argue that the Eleventh Circuit's strident
defense of its states' restrictive grooming policies can no longer stand,
and that as a commensurate consequence, it must bring itself in line with
the doctrinal interpretation of other courts and the Department of Justice
that demand a closer look into the need for restrictive grooming stan-
dards as applied to specific inmates.
At bottom, the legal principle that I offer and advance in this Arti-
cle is this: that restrictive grooming policies can no longer be imposed
on inmates with sincere religious beliefs that require adherents to wear
beards or long hair, unless the state has a particularized evidentiary basis
that the specific plaintiffs or inmates in question pose an actual or
threatened risk to the state's compelling penological interests. It is this
principle that the Eleventh Circuit should adopt and that finds support in
precedent, existing penal policies, and the progress of the law in this
field. It diverges with the Eleventh Circuit's current approach which has
the following principal deficiencies that are symptomatic of excessive
deference to the prison authorities: the approach does not ask why the
states need restrictive grooming policies where a vast majority of juris-
928 [Vol. 66:923
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dictions do not resort to restrictive grooming policies despite having the
same penological interests, does not push states on why the issuance of
medical exemptions to restrictive grooming policies does not undermine
the argument that religious exemptions cannot be similarly provided,
and does not demand any evidence that the inmates requesting religious
accommodations themselves have given rise to the penological concerns
justifying the restrictive grooming policies.
The suggestion that a federal circuit court is out of step with other
courts and with the Department of Justice may, on its own, justify a
serious inquiry as to the nature of the split, the merits of the different
views, and which camp the arc of the law should move towards. Consis-
tency among the courts is valuable and is a legal and social good in
itself. It is particularly necessary to seek harmony among the courts
where a circuit court may be unduly depriving individuals of rights,
including the freedom to practice one's religion. The Department of Jus-
tice's recent and active participation in multiple cases also signals the
importance of this particular issue and reflects the agency's perception
that it is in need of clarity.3 ' The diverging views in the courts and the
Department of Justice's affirmative involvement point to the possibility
that the Supreme Court may be called upon to issue a single, uniform
standard that will apply to all prison facilities.
This Article may help define what that ultimate standard should
be-if the one I propose is satisfactory, if a similar alternative is more
preferable, or if the solution lies completely elsewhere. It is hoped,
moreover, that this Article, given recent advancements, will be useful
for the bar and bench in shaping the direction of the Eleventh Circuit's
future cases in this area, and for states within the Eleventh Circuit in
effectively responding to potential legal attacks on their grooming
policies.32
What follows is my modest attempt to achieve these objectives and
enrich legal and public understanding of the permissibility of prison
grooming standards that conflict with the religious requirements of
incarcerated individuals.
31. In fact, several federal courts have noted, in the context of qualified immunity, that
inmates may not be able to recover damages against prison officials for RLUIPA violations. See
Farrow v. Stanley, No. Civ.02-567-PB, 2005 WL 2671541, at *11 n. 13 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2005)
(discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 and commenting on the "substantial uncertainty ... as to
whether [RLUIPA] even provides a right to money damages."); see also Bryan v. Capers, No.
8:06-cv-2515-GRA-BHH, 2007 WL 2116452, at *6 n.4 (D.S.C. July 19, 2007) (acknowledging
the "uncertainty" and listing other cases that address it).
32. For an "anti-oppression" theory response to inmate grooming policies, based on equal
protection and Free Exercise principles, see generally Mara R. Schneider, Note, Splitting Hairs:
Why Courts Uphold Prison Grooming Policies and Why They Should Not, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L.
503 (2004).
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II: INTRODUCTION TO APPLICABLE LAW AND
INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
A. Governing Legal Provisions and Policies
Inmates challenging prison grooming policies on religious freedom
grounds have available to them constitutional and statutory vehicles for
relief. A brief summary of these provisions and how they differ is in
order.
The Free Exercise Clause is the explicit constitutional instrument
safeguarding religious freedom from governmental intrusion or interfer-
ence. It provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion.]"3 3 In general terms, individuals seeking relig-
ious-based exemptions to neutral, generally applicable government laws
or policies, including prison grooming standards, may, at least theoreti-
cally, rely on this express constitutional guarantee. Practically, however,
the Free Exercise Clause has not served as a robust protection against
federal or state encroachments on religious freedom. Individuals pursu-
ing such constitutional claims also face a patchwork of standards that
have evolved over time and that are of one type for the federal govern-
ment and are of multiple variations among the states. This situation, and
the limited force of the Free Exercise Clause more broadly, helps
explain why Congress enacted statutory remedies to bolster individual
religious freedom from state regulation in prisons.
As a historical matter, the Free Exercise Clause was read to require
an exemption to generally applicable government policies in quite lim-
ited circumstances, that is, only if the statute or policy expressly pro-
vided for one.34 In 1963, however, a landmark Free Exercise ruling was
issued. The Supreme Court held in Sherbert v. Verner that a sincere
religious objector" is entitled to an exemption from a generally applica-
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. As noted above, supra note 2, the Free Exercise Clause has been
incorporated against the States. For a discussion of earlier drafts of this guarantee, see Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-15 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (tracking the development of the
religion clause from "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed" to its current form) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
34. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1465, 1473 (1999) ("When should such exemptions be granted, and who should decide when they
should be granted? Until 1963, the general answer seemed to be that the matter was up to the
legislature . . . .").
35. The beliefs need not be longstanding, central to the claimant's religious beliefs, internally
consistent, consistent with any written scripture, or reasonable from the judge's perspective. They
need only be sincere. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981) ("[lt is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 547 (2d
930 [Vol. 66:923
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ble law that imposes a substantial burden on the individual's exercise of
his or her religion, unless the law in question survives strict scrutiny. 6 A
substantial burden is generally defined as either compelling an individ-
ual to do that which violates his or her religious beliefs or prohibiting an
individual from that which is mandated by his or her religious beliefs.17
After Sherbert, the Court issued several opinions respecting the
First Amendment rights of prisoners. In 1972, the Court stated in Cruz v.
Beto that "reasonable oportunities [sic] must be afforded to all prisoners
to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First . . . Amend-
ment without fear of penalty."" In Procunier v. Martinez, a 1974 case,
the Court clarified that prison regulations implicating the First Amend-
ment religious rights of incarcerated individuals must further "an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest" and "must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved."3
The degree to which the religious rights of incarcerated individuals
were protected appeared to have diminished shortly thereafter. In Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., handed down in 1977,
the Court stated that a district court should have only required the prison
officials to show that the state prison authorities' "beliefs" as to the
necessity of the First Amendment restrictions were not "unreasona-
ble."4 0 In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court in 1987 similarly held
that a prisoner's free exercise claim will be "judged under a 'reasonable-
ness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringe-
ments of fundamental constitutional rights."4 ' In Turner v. Safley, issued
the same year, the Court explained that "when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.""2 The Court iden-
tified "several factors [that] are relevant in determining the reasonable-
ness of the regulation at issue," specifically whether there is "a valid,
rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it"; "whether there are alter-
native means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates";
"the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
Cir. 2006) ("[T]he question of the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs is inherently within
that individual's unique purview . . . .").
36. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
37. Id. at 404.
38. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
39. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
40. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1977).
41. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
42. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally"; and whether there are "ready alternatives" to the prison
regulation.4 3
Outside of the prison context, in the 1990 Employment Division v.
Smith decision, the Court distinguished Sherbert and effectively reverted
back to the rule in which an exemption to facially neutral laws or poli-
cies for religious reasons was required only when the statute itself
carved out an exemption.' The Court took the view that groups seeking
exemptions from generally applicable laws may convince others of their
need by way of the political process, but that such exemptions were not
"constitutionally required."4 5 Smith thus represented a tectonic shift in
the Court's general Free Exercise jurisprudence.
In 1993, in response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which functionally adopted the 1963
Court's standard and restored Sherbert's model. In 1997, the Court in
City of Boerne v. Flores concluded that RFRA is unconstitutional as
applied to the states, leaving it effective only with respect to the federal
government.4 6
Following City of Boerne, some states enacted constitutional or
statutory provisions: eleven states passed state constitutional provisions
requiring laws or policies substantially burdening the religious practices
43. Id. at 89-90 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Though the Court does not
mark this consideration as a separate factor, it nonetheless states that part of the reasonableness
analysis is examining whether the governmental objective is a "legitimate and neutral one," that is
whether the "prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operate[ ] in a neutral
fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." Id. at 90.
44. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990). Religion
clause scholar Professor Michael W. McConnell suggests that the Court in Smith improvidently
changed course, and that the pre-Smith rule is "more consistent with the original understanding" of
the free exercise guarantee "than is a position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation."
McConnell, supra note 8, at 1512; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1144-45 (1990).
45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. On this point, Justice O'Connor disagreed that exemptions for
religious practices should be left to the political process. See id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious
practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free
exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or
emerging religious groups . . . ."); see id. at 903 ("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.") (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)).
46. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 715 n.2 (2005) ("RFRA, Courts of Appeals have held, remains operative as to the
Federal Government and federal territories and possessions.").
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of employees to survive strict scrutiny, as in RFRA; New York enacted
a state constitutional provision requiring intermediate, not strict, scru-
tiny; and fifteen states adopted statutory equivalents to the RFRA. The
remaining states adhere to Smith's statutory exemption model.47 Though
a full critique of the differing levels of protections afforded to individu-
als seeking religious exemptions to generally applicable laws and poli-
cies is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that scholars
have argued that this "situation, in which some religious practices of
some citizens are governed by [the 1990 rule], and some by the tougher
standard of . . . RFRA, creates an unacceptable inequality in access to
fundamental liberties."4 8
In 2000, following City of Boerne, Congress passed RLUIPA,4 9 a
clear effort to reinstate heightened protection of religious freedom in the
prison context. 0 While the substantive goals of RFRA and RLUIPA are
comparable, their sources of constitutional authority differ. Whereas
RFRA was enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power and subsequently struck down as exceeding this
authority,"' RLUIPA was passed under Congress's commerce and
spending powers, and whether it is a valid exercise of Congress's Article
I authority has not been placed into doubt by the Supreme Court.5 2
RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person resid-
ing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability," unless the burden (1) "is in furtherance of
47. See Eugene Volokh, Some Background on Religious Exemption Law, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 12, 2010, 19:07 EST), http://volokh.com/2010/06/12/some-background-on-
religious-exemption-law-2/ (June 12, 2010, 19:07 EST); Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemption
Map of the United States, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2010, 17:36 EST), http://volokh.
com/2010/07/09/religious-exemption-law-map-of-the-united-states/.
48. Martha C. Nussbaum, Deliberation and Insight: Bloch v. Frischholz and the "Chicago
School" of Judicial Behavior, 77 U. CI. L. REV. 1139, 1158-59 (2010).
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
50. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655-56 (2011) ("RLUIPA is Congress' second
attempt to accord heightened statutory protection to religious exercise in the wake of this Court's
decision in [Smith] . .. .We held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments
because it exceeded Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress
responded by enacting RLUIPA . . . ."); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714 ("RLUIPA is the latest of long-
running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-
imposed burdens . . . ."); see also River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611
F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing RLUIPA as part of a "decade-long tug of war
between Congress and the Supreme Court over the protection of religious liberty.").
51. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516, 536.
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2), 2000cc-l(b) (2000). The Eleventh Circuit has construed
RLUIPA to "hinge[ ] on Congress' Spending Power, rather than its Commerce Clause Power."
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1274 n.9 (1 Ith Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds; Sossamon,
131 S. Ct. at 1656 (declining to address whether the Commerce Clause or Spending Clause
permitted Congress to enact RLUIPA).
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a compelling governmental interest"; and (2) "is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."" Given its
stricter standard, and Smith's alleged "emasculation" of free exercise,"
RLUIPA is, understandably, the preferred avenue for relief for inmates
demanding religious exemptions to or contesting the validity of state
prison grooming policies."
As to its other particulars, "religious exercise" under RLUIPA is
defined broadly to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."" An incarcer-
ated individual keeping his or her hair for religious reasons would fall
squarely within this category of protected expression contemplated by
the statute.
A plaintiff bringing a RLUIPA claim bears the initial burden of
proving the existence of a "substantial burden."5 RLUIPA leaves open
the meaning of a "substantial burden,"5 9 compelling the courts to fashion
their own workable definition of the term."o The Eleventh Circuit under-
stands "substantial burden" to mean that which "place[s] more than an
inconvenience on religious exercise," such as "significant pressure
which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her
behavior accordingly." 6 1 In other words, the court has stated, "[A] sub-
stantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to
forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious
conduct."62
It is beyond dispute that a prison grooming policy that would
restrict or forbid an inmate from growing his or her hair, where an
inmate's religion mandates that such hair be maintained, directly inter-
feres with a cognizable religious exercise and that this conflict repre-
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2000).
54. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv. 198, 204
(1990) (Smith "effectively abandons the fundamental liberty of religious conscience" embodied in
the Free Exercise Clause).
55. Accordingly, as it is the primary tool for litigation in this area and is invariably the
emphasis of resulting court opinions, RLUIPA is emphasized in this Article as compared to the
Free Exercise Clause.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
57. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2000).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000) (definitions); see also 146 CONG. REc. S7776 (daily ed.
July 27, 2000) ("it is not the intent of [RLUIPA] to create a new standard for the definition of
'substantial burden' on religious exercise."); 146 CONG. REc. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000)
(joint statement of Sens. Hatch & Kennedy) ("substantial burden" should be interpreted with
reference to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence as to "the concept of substantial burden or
religious exercise.").
60. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 1227.
62. Id.; accord Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
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sents a "substantial burden" within the meaning of RLUIPA.63 The core
question therefore becomes whether the prison officials can meet their
burden of proving that they possess a compelling state interest in insti-
tuting a restrictive grooming policy and whether the policy itself is the
least restrictive means to further that interest.64
B. Penological Concerns
As a general matter, prison officials possess significant authority to
manage prisons given the distinctive circumstances of penal settings and
the pressing needs in them. The Supreme Court, for example, observed
that correctional facilities are "a unique place fraught with serious secur-
ity dangers." 65 Further, the Court noted, running a prison facility is "an
inordinately difficult undertaking,"6 6 and "the problems that arise in the
day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy
solutions."67 In light of the specialized issues within detention facilities,
and the inherently complicated nature of prison management, the Court
accords prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security." 6 8 Put differently, handling such matters "is peculiarly a matter
normally left to the discretion of prison administrators."69
As part of its generous authority to manage the affairs within deten-
tion facilities, some prisons officials have regulated the manner in which
inmates may grow or maintain their hair.70 Each of the states within the
Eleventh Circuit has invoked such authority to set restrictive grooming
policies for inmates and to denote possible punishment if inmates do not
conform to the policies. Each state within the Eleventh Circuit also pro-
vides an exemption to such policies for medical reasons. As to its
inmates, Florida mandates that:
Male inmates shall have their hair cut short to medium uniform
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Ozmint, 444 F. Supp. 2d 502, 506 (D.S.C. 2006) ("[A] policy which
requires hair to be cut, and ensures compliance by force, imposes a substantial burden to one of
the Rastafarian faith."); Department of Justice Garner Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 6
("Defendants do not dispute that th[e] ban [on growing beards] imposed a substantial burden on
Garner's religious exercise.").
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
65. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
66. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987).
67. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
68. Id. See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("We are not unmindful that prison
officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners
necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and regulations.").
69. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981).
70. See infra Appendix B.
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length at all times with no part of the ear or collar covered. Male
inmates shall be permitted to shave their entire heads in a uniform
manner unless the inmate is using his hairstyle or lack thereof to
demonstrate gang affiliation or otherwise pose a threat to institutional
security . . . . Sideburns shall not extend beyond the bottom of the
earlobes and will have straight lines with no flare at the base. All
inmates shall be clean shaven, with the exception of [certain] inmates
[with mental health classifications] . . . .
Additionally an exemption from the requirement to remain clean
shaven shall be granted on the basis of a medical diagnosis when it is
determined by the staff physician that shaving would be detrimental
to the inmate's health. Inmates granted a medical exemption from the
shaving requirement may be required to keep their facial hair closely
trimmed with scissors or clippers. For the purposes of this rule,
"closely trimmed" means trimmed so that no part of the facial hair
exceeds the length prescribed by the physician as necessary to pre-
vent the appearance or reappearance of skin disorders. If no specific
length is prescribed, then facial hair shall be kept trimmed to within
one-quarter inch. 71
Inmates who are not in compliance with this policy are subject to
discipline and prison staff may be directed "to shave the inmate or cut
the inmate's hair, or take other necessary action to bring the inmate
into compliance with the grooming standards."7 2
Georgia's grooming policies provide that:
Each inmate shall have a conventional haircut. Hair shall not be
longer than three (3) inches; shall not extend beyond a point which
would reach the collar on an ordinary shirt; and shall not cover any
part of the ears or eyebrows. Inmates may wear sideburns no longer
than a point even with the bottom of the ear canal. Mustaches are
permitted, but shall not extend beyond the edge of the mouth and
must be kept neat and trimmed at all times. Goatees, beards, and sim-
ilar facial adornments are prohibited, unless medically indicated.
Non-compliance with the grooming policies is considered to be a
violation and may subject the offending inmate to institutional
discipline.74
Finally, with respect to Alabama's relevant grooming policies:
[Inmates] are expected to maintain a good personal appearance. Male
inmates are expected to be clean shaven and neat. Mustaches and
beards are not permitted. There is opportunity for haircuts so
71. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.101(4) (2012) (governing the care of inmates).
72. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.101(5) (2012); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-
601.301-314 (2012) (rules pertaining to inmate discipline).
73. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-2-3-.04(6) (2010) (governing personal hygiene).
74. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 125-3-2-.04(g)(3)-(5) (2010) (conduct that qualifies as a
violation under the regulations).
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[inmates] can keep [their] hair well-groomed. Barbers are instructed
in regard to proper haircuts and are not permitted to give special hair-
cuts. Sideburns may be wom medium length and extended no longer
75than the middle of the ear.
[Inmates may be exempted from these policies for medical reasons]
based on the [decision of the state's] physician. [Exemptions] are
normally issued for a certain length of time. In the case of shaving,
the inmate will not be allowed to have hair longer than an 1/8th of an
inch.
If an inmate is not following grooming policies they may receive a
disciplinary citation. This citation could include a loss of priviledges
[sic] such as phone or canteen use.77
These states' policies are justified and stand on four principal ratio-
nales: identification, security, health, and order. Identification and
security are related. As an example, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that
inmate grooming requirements are part of a "security rule relating to the
identification of inmates in the event of escape or other incidents . . . .""
And, as Alabama has noted, "[I]f an inmate were allowed to have long
hair, he could alter his appearance and thus make his identification diffi-
cult after a major incident, including escape."so In addition to enabling
positive identification, the other side of the security coin is that restric-
tive grooming policies are said to prevent individuals from adopting an
appearance to identify or associate with a gang." An additional justifica-
tion falling within the realm of security is that long hair or a beard may
be used to conceal contraband or weapons.8 2 Third, such restrictive
grooming policies are also said to encourage and ensure proper hygiene
75. Email from Brian Corbett, Pub. Info. Officer, Ala. Dep't of Corr., to the author (Nov. 7,
2011, 11:13AM EST) (on file with author). These Alabama personal appearance policies also
contain a visual depiction of these grooming requirements. See infra Appendix A.
76. Email from Brian Corbett, Pub. Info. Officer, Ala. Dep't of Corr., to the author (Dec. 5,
2011, 07:56 EST) (on file with author).
77. Email from Brian Corbett, Pub. Info. Officer, Ala. Dep't of Corr., to the author (Dec. 13,
2011, 07:39 EST) (on file with author).
78. See Corbett 11/7/11 Email, supra note 75. ("Hair must be wom in proper style for health,
identification, and security reasons.").
79. Solomon v. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579, 1581 (1lth Cir. 1989).
80. Memorandum of Ala. Att'y Gen., Dean v. Giles, 2:07-cv-342-WKW, at 2 (M.D. Ala.
Aug. 21, 2009) (No. 40).
81. See Lawson v. Dep't of Corrections, No. 4:04-cv-00105-MP-AK, 2006 WL 1737131, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2006); cf. Pressley v. Madison, No. 2:08-CV-0157-RWS, 2010 WL
5313762, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2010) ("[P]rohibiting persons from wearing any form of
headwear" is rationally related to "the need to maintain security, discourage potential gang
activity, and facilitate the identification of inmates . . . ."); Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325,
1350 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (prison officials "contend that headwear is frequently associated with gang
identification, and thus headwear restrictions reduce the likelihood of gang violence in prison.").
82. See Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504 (1lth Cir. 1996).
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amongst inmates. Finally, these regulations are considered to "promote
order and discipline."84
Under RLUIPA, it is necessary for a state to possess a compelling
state interest in order to substantially burden an inmate's religious prac-
tices. As to the aforementioned core state interests undergirding the
restrictive grooming policies, the ability to identify inmates is a compel-
ling state interest" and "[i]t is well established that states have a com-
pelling interest in security and order within their prisons."8 6 The
Eleventh Circuit also has acknowledged that ensuring the health of
inmates, ostensibly including their hygiene, is a compelling state
interest.
In theory, at least, these interests can give rise to and support deten-
tion facility policies that call on inmates to cut or shave their hair.
Whether these interests stand up to scrutiny and whether a facility's pol-
icies are the least restrictive means to advance the stated interests remain
open questions requiring further examination.
C. Inmate Rights
The corollary to, or flip-side of, the prison officials' authority with
respect to the operation and administration of prison facilities is the
commensurately restrained rights of individual inmates. The Supreme
Court has explained that "certain privileges and rights must necessarily
be limited in the prison context."" "[L]awful incarceration," in other
words, generally "brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system."o This is the case even when First
Amendment rights are at stake. A prisoner possesses only "those First
83. See Lawson, 2006 WL 1737131, at *2-*3.
84. Solomon, 888 F.2d at 1581-82.
85. Harris, 97 F.3d at 504; see also Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2000)
("requir[ing] inmates to be clean-shaven and to keep their hair cut short" is "necessary for
identification purposes: Without it inmates would be able to change their appearances with ease
simply by shaving off their beards or cutting their hair," which "is especially relevant ... when
investigating escapes or intra-prison crimes.").
86. Harris, 97 F.3d at 504 (citing Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512 (11th Cir. 1996));
see also Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x 892, 895-96 (11th Cir. 2010); Linehan v. Crosby, 346
F. App'x 471, 473 (11th Cir. 2009); Lathan v. Thompson, 251 F. App'x 665, 667 (11th Cir. 2007).
87. See Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App'x 771, 776 (11th Cir. 2005).
88. See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of
Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 90 (2006)
("[P]risoners have many of their liberties curtailed; that is the nature of imprisonment-it
punishes and rehabilitates via the exercise of control over the prisoner.").
89. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005).
90. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Two eminent legal minds found
this decision to be "troublesome." Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34-35 n.72 (1989).
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Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections sys-
tem." 91 In short, in the words of the Court, "The fact of confinement and
the needs of- the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional
rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, which are
implicit in incarceration."9 2
Accordingly, consistent with the heightened authority of prison
officials and the diminished rights of inmates, including those stemming
from the First Amendment, the Court has routinely sustained limitations
on inmates' First Amendment rights. For example, the Court has upheld
prison regulations that restrict a prisoner's ability to receive visitors,9 3 to
correspond with other inmates, 94 to receive subscription publications,95
and to attend weekly religious services. 96
These circumstances-that the scales are generally tipped in favor
of the prison authorities and away from the prisoner's rights, and the
willingness of the Court to reject First Amendment challenges to prison
regulations-do not bode well for inmates where there is a conflict
between his or her religious expression and prison grooming regulations.
The potential for such conflict is great, and the variety of inmates impli-
cated by the conflict significant.
For example, "[U]ltra-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews typically wear
beards and payot (side curls) as an inherent requirement of Jewish tradi-
tion." 97 One commentator notes that "Orthodox Jews do not shave any
part of the beard, at any time, for any reason."" In addition to Jews,
Sunni Muslims read the Qu'ran to command the wearing of a beard.99
"The refusal by a Sunni Muslim male who can grow a beard, to wear
one is a major sin," an imam has stated. o "Members of the Sikh faith
91. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
92. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
93. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003).
94. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81
(1987).
95. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989).
96. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987).
97. Sarah Abigail Wolkinson, A Critical Historical and Legal Reappraisal of Bhatia v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.: Judicial Emasculation of the Duty of Accommodation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L.
1185, 1188 (2010); see also Eric J. Zogry, Orthodox Jewish Prisoners and the Turner Effect, 56
LA. L. REV. 905, 913 (1996) (describing the prohibition against cutting facial hair adhered to by
Orthodox Jews).
98. Zogry, supra note 97, at 913.
99. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360
(3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999).
100. Id.
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are required to keep their hair unshorn."'o' The Sikh Code of Conduct
"lists unshorn hair as the first article of faith," and identifies "dishonor-
ing the hair" as the first forbidden practice of a Sikh.10 2 Rastafarians also
are not permitted to shave or cut their hair.'13 "A fundamental tenet
of the religion is that a Rastafarian's hair is not to be combed or
cut . . . .
D. The Role of the Courts
The courts, perhaps unsurprisingly based on the foregoing, have
been quite deferential to prison officials in reviewing prison policies.
That is, the Supreme Court has stated that courts have a "very limited
role . . . in the administration of detention facilities." 05 This is for two
principal, independent reasons. The first relates to the disinclination of
the courts to substitute their judgment as to the need or prudence of
prison policies for that of detention authorities, while the second relates
to separation of powers considerations.
First, institutional competence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that "[t]he problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable" and that "[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult
undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources . . . ."106 Accordingly, "[P]rison authorities are best equipped
to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration."'1 To put it
another way, "Such considerations are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of corrections officials." 0 8 The courts them-
selves "are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform" and the problems inherent in prison
management "are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree."lO9
Second, the tripartite system of government. As the Supreme Court
observed:
[Jiudicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator
ordinarily will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better
grasp of his domain than the reviewing judge, but also because the
operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of
101. DAWINDER S. SIDHU & NEHA SINGH GoHIL, CIVIL RIGHTS IN WARTIME: THE POST-9/1l
SIKH EXPERIENCE 1 (2009).
102. Id. at 43; see also id. at 23 (enumerating the five Sikh articles of faith).
103. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 896 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (Mass. 2008).
104. Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1990).
105. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984).
106. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1956 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation and
quotations omitted) (alterations added).
107. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990).
108. Block, 468 U.S. at 584 (citation and quotations omitted).
109. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1956 (citation and quotations omitted).
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the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the
Judicial.' "o
That is, "Prison administration is . . . a task that has been committed to
the responsibility of [the legislative and executive] branches, and separa-
tion of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint."'"
That said, courts are not to be silent or inert in this area. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates" from their individual rights.' 12 More to the
point, the Court has made clear that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.""' Accord-
ingly, where it is alleged that prison policies offend an inmate's rights,
federal courts are duty-bound to intervene to give meaning to those pro-
tections. As the Court noted, "When a prison regulation or practice
offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will dis-
charge their duty to protect constitutional rights.""' An inmate's claim
that a prison grooming policy violates his or her First Amendment rights
activates the federal courts' traditional function of ensuring that his or
her rights have not been abridged-even if the alleged violation occurs
within the specialized physical and social space of America's prisons.
In sum, plaintiffs challenging a state prison facility's inmate
grooming policies have available to them constitutional and statutory
remedies: the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA,
respectively. In determining whether a detention facility's grooming pol-
icies are within the bounds of the law, federal courts are to give due
consideration to state prison officials, who invoke security, identifica-
tion, health, and order as the rationales for restrictive grooming policies.
While prison officials are entitled to deference, and while individual
rights do survive to some degree in the penal environment, federal courts
are to still engage in meaningful judicial review as to the constitutional-
ity and statutory permissibility of the contested prison practices or
policies.
With this general backdrop in mind, it is appropriate to consider
and explore the means by which the Eleventh Circuit has resolved suits
110. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979).
Ill. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987); see also Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450,
1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[I]ssues of prison management are, both by reason of separation of
powers and highly practical considerations of judicial competence, peculiarly ill-suited to judicial
resolution[.] [Aiccordingly, courts should be loath to substitute their judgment for that of prison
officials and administrators.").
112. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
113. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
114. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
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filed by inmates alleging that restrictive grooming policies contravene
their protected religious rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA.
III. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE ON RELIGIOUS-
BASED CHALLENGES TO INMATE
GROOMING STANDARDS
Despite the changes in the applicable legal standards in prisoner
suits under the First Amendment or statutory law, the Eleventh Circuit
has routinely upheld the restrictive grooming policies implemented by
states within its jurisdiction. In 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was split, forming the newly created Eleventh Circuit."'
As the Eleventh Circuit adopted, as binding precedent, rulings of the
Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981,116 it is important to examine rele-
vant Fifth Circuit decisions issued before this date. This overview indi-
cates that both the original Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit that
followed were consistently hostile to and dismissive of religious-based
First Amendment and statutory challenges to restrictive inmate groom-
ing standards.
A. Early Free Exercise Cases
In 1970, the unified Fifth Circuit heard a case brought by a Florida
inmate who alleged that "his mustache is a gift from his creator" and
that the prison's requirement that he be clean-shaven was "an infringe-
ment upon his religious liberties as guaranteed by the Constitution."" 7
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding that "[tihe rule in ques-
tion is applied to all inmates alike" and that "[flor personal cleanliness
and. for personal identification under prison conditions, the rule appears
to be neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.""' In another brief per curiam
opinion issued subsequently the same year, the Fifth Circuit agreed with
the district court that a Free Exercise challenge to Florida's "prison's
rules requiring inmates to shave twice a week and receive periodic hair-
cuts" was "frivolous."'19 The court, following the previous opinion, reit-
erated that as "the haircut and shave regulations promote 'cleanliness
and . . . personal identification' . . . the state has not enforced an unrea-
115. See Honorable Stanley Marcus, Foreword, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 969, 969 (2008) ("The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was created by an Act of Congress in
1981. The Act carved [the Eleventh Circuit] out of the historic Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. . . .") (citing Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
452, 94 Stat. 1994).
116. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
117. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376, 1376 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
118. Id. at 1377.
119. Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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sonable and arbitrary regulation." 20
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit granted short-lived procedural relief to a
Muslim inmate, who asserted that the Florida prison regulation requiring
"him to shave off his beard" "violated the First Amendment because his
Islamic religious faith requires him to let his beard flow . . . ." The
court held that the two preceding cases from 1970 were "severely under-
cut" by intervening Supreme Court pronouncements, such as
Procunier.12 2 Not persuaded that it was bound to adhere to the 1970
cases in light of the altered jurisprudence in the area of First Amendment
rights of prisoners, the court held that the district court "should not have
dismissed plaintiff's First Amendment claim without a hearing inquiring
into plaintiff's alleged sincerely held religious beliefs and into the state's
justifications for its regulations."' 2 3 On remand, the plaintiff did not fare
well. The district court concluded that "the no-beard rule .. . has facili-
tated prompt recapture of escapees in the past" and that "the prison shav-
ing regulation, to the extent that it prohibits this plaintiff at a maximum
security prison from growing a beard in conformity with his religious
beliefs, is not violative of the [F]irst [A]mendment."l 2 4
This trend of rejecting inmates' substantive religious freedom chal-
lenges to prison grooming regulations continued after the formation of
the Eleventh Circuit. The new federal circuit's first major foray into this
field of law occurred in 1986. In that case, Abdul Hakim Jamal Nasir
Shabbaz, an inmate at a Florida prison facility and a Muslim, claimed
that "prison officials had violated his First Amendment right to freely
exercise his Islamic faith by forcing him to shave his beard . . . ."' In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit, effectively applying
Procunier, found that the prison's "no beards" rule furthered the sub-
stantial governmental interest of ensuring authorities can identify
inmates in case of escape, and that there were no alternative means to
further this interest, such as an updated photograph, because "a beard is
not static"-in other words, "A beard can grow longer, be cut shorter, be
trimmed or altered, and even the color of it changed."' 2 6
In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Free Exercise claim
brought by Reuven Maimon, an Orthodox Jew, who objected to Flor-
ida's inmate "require[ments] that inmates be clean shaven and that side-
120. Id. (quoting Brown, 419 F.2d at 1376).
121. Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 598 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1979).
122. Id. at 347 n.4.
123. Id. at 347.
124. Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712, 716 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
125. Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d 1536, 1537 (1lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1011 (1986).
126. Id. at 1540.
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burns be unflared and no longer than the inmate's ear lobe" because "the
tenets of his faith require that the male face not be shaved and that
payehs or earlocks be maintained and allowed to grow freely."12 1 In a
short two-paragraph per curiam order, the Eleventh Circuit noted that its
decision is "controlled" by its Shabazz ruling. 128 As the two inmates
"raised essentially the same arguments" which were rejected in Shabazz,
the court denied Maimon's claim without any additional discussion or
analysis. 129
The same year, the Eleventh Circuit in Brightly v. Wainwright
heard a consolidated action brought by a group of Florida inmates, mem-
bers of the Ethopian Zion Coptic Church prohibited by their faith from
shaving or cutting their hair, who asserted that the state prison's "rule
requiring all inmates to shave or cut their hair violated their First
Amendment right to freely exercise their religion." 30 Before the district
court, the state argued that the restriction was "designed to: (1) aid in the
recapture of prisoners following their escape; (2) establish a uniform
grooming policy; and (3) reduce the security risk inherent in maintaining
a prison."'131 In a one-page opinion, the Eleventh Circuit, finding that the
cases were "controlled" by its Shabazz and Maimon decisions, held that
"[lt]he state's grooming regulation is rationally related to a substantial
government interest and that restriction is no greater than necessary to
accomplish its purpose."l 3 2
B. Major Doctrinal Guideposts
In a significant case that is noteworthy for our purposes and for its
unusually extended analysis, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a religious
freedom claim advanced by Anthony Martinelli, a Florida inmate and
member of the Greek Orthodox religion, which does not permit adher-
ents to cut their hair or beard.13 3 Martinelli alleged that the prison's
"requirement that all inmates, except those who qualify for a medical
exemption, be clean shaven and wear their hair cut short," infringed
upon his protected free exercise rights.' 4 Applying the same two-part
test used in Brightly, the district court ruled in Martinelli's favor, as
recounted by the Eleventh Circuit:
127. Maimon v. Wainwright, 792 F.2d 133, 133 (11th Cir. 1986).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Brightly v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 612, 612-13 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 944 (1987).
131. Id. at 613.
132. Id.
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[A]lthough the shaving and hair length regulations further the state's
interest in security, prohibiting Martinelli from growing a beard is not
the least restrictive alternative because other prisoners are allowed to
grow short beards for medical reasons . . .. Martinelli [must be per-
mitted] to grow a beard to one-quarter inch in length in conformity
with the medical exemption to the shaving requirement . . . .
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that the state's interests in the regula-
tion were substantial, and the inmate conceded this point as well.1 3 6
With respect to whether the clean-shaven and hair length requirements
were the least restrictive alternative in light of the medical exemption,
however, the Court reversed the district court's holding. In particular,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that a religious exemption mirroring the
medical exemption is not the least restrictive alternative because (1)
"inmates with one-quarter inch beards [ostensibly] present a greater
security risk than inmates without beards," (2) Martinelli cannot shave at
all for religious reasons and he has not alleged that "cutting his beard at
the skin is a greater violation of his religious beliefs than cutting his
beard one-quarter of an inch from his skin," and (3) "the existence of the
medical exemption does not in any way defeat [the state's] claimed
interests in support of the shaving and hair length regulations," adding
that the exemption is "granted only where the staff physician determines
that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's health.""' The circuit
court acknowledged that "some other prison systems do not deem it nec-
essary to impose similar regulations," but found nonetheless that "the
evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the regulations in
this case are rationally related to the substantial interests advanced.""'
In a subsequent case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Free Exer-
cise and RFRA claims brought by Vincent D. Harris, a Rastafarian
inmate who could not "shave, cut, or comb [his] hair or beard" in accor-
dance with his faith.' 3 9 Harris refused, because of his religious beliefs, to
submit to medium-length haircuts mandated by the Florida corrections
policies, and ultimately was "forcibly removed . .. from his cell, [taken]
to the laundry room, and [was] restrained . . . while his hair was cut by
another inmate."14 0 The circuit court recognized that RFRA heightened
the standard used in Martinelli.14 ' Under RFRA, the court noted, the
"[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
135. Id. at 1502-03.
136. See id. at 1506.
137. Id. at 1507 (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id. at 1506.
139. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 502 (1lth Cir. 1996).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 503.
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only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est."' 42 Examining the claims under this standard, the court "assume[d]"
that the prison regulation requiring Harris to be clean shaven and have
short hair substantially burdened the exercise of his religion, determined
"that states have a compelling interest in security and order within their
prisons," and admitted it was "unable to suggest any lesser means than a
hair length rule for satisfying these interests."14 3
C. Modern Post-RLUIPA Case
As noted above, Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000 in response to
City of Boerne. A plaintiff's RLUIPA claim challenging inmate groom-
ing policies made its way to the Eleventh Circuit in short order. In that
case, Leslie Brunskill, a Native American whose "religious belief' gen-
erally prohibited the cutting of his hair, filed suit alleging that Florida's
grooming policy requiring inmates to "maintain medium length hair"
infringed upon his rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA.'4
As to the First Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit noted that because the
court had previously held valid virtually identical grooming policies
under the heightened standard applied in Harris, the regulations were
permissible under the lower "reasonableness" standard applicable to
Free Exercise claims under the Supreme Court's opinion in Turner.145
With respect to RLUIPA, the court noted that the statute requires
the government to show, where the state substantially burdens an
inmate's religious practice, "that the imposition of the burden furthers a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest."1 46 The court determined that the state was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law "since the hair length policy [is] the
least restrictive means in furthering compelling governmental interests
in the security, health, and safety of inmates and staff.""'
In short, irrespective of the vehicle used by an inmate with a relig-
ious objection to a state correctional facility's restrictive grooming poli-
cies-the First Amendment, RFRA, or RLUIPA-the Eleventh Circuit
(as currently constituted or as part of the old Fifth Circuit) has decided at
every turn to uphold the substantive validity of the grooming standards.
While the legal landscape has changed throughout this time, due to
142. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2000)).
143. Id. at 503-04.
144. Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App'x 771, 773 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 774-75.
146. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2000)).
147. Id. at 776.
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Supreme Court decisions or statutory developments, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has maintained its reluctance to disturb the judgments of the prison
officials that the policies advance sufficiently important interests and are
an appropriate means to satisfy these penological concerns. In what fol-
lows, I suggest that this approach must be revisited and replaced with a
more searching standard that reflects the relevance of medical exemp-
tions on the propriety of identical religious exemptions, the ability of
most jurisdictions to meet the same penal interests without imposing
restrictive grooming policies on inmates with religious views that man-
date beards or long hair, and the need for particularized evidence justify-
ing the imposition of such policies on particular inmates whose religious
beliefs conflict with the policies.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DEFERENTIAL SUPPORT OF
RESTRICTIVE INMATE GROOMING POLICIES
A. General Principles
Several basic principles may guide an analysis of an inmate's relig-
ious challenge to a penal institution's restrictive grooming policies.
These foundational principles are difficult to square with the Eleventh
Circuit's approach to cases in this area of law.
First, "Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates"
from protections of their individual rights.4 Accordingly, where an
inmate alleges that prison policies offend an inmate's fundamental
rights, federal courts must intervene to give meaning to those protec-
tions.' 4 9 An inmate's complaint activates the federal courts' traditional
function of ensuring that his or her religious rights have not been
abridged.
Second, in determining whether a state's grooming policies are
within the bounds of the law, federal courts are to give due consideration
to the actual internal circumstances of the state's detention facilities.5 o
While prison officials are entitled to deference as to the management of
their detention facilities, federal courts are to still engage in meaningful
judicial review as to the legality of the relevant prison practices or
policies. 151
148. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
149. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
150. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
151. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons
but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners . . . . [P]ersons
in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for redress of
grievances . . . .").
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Third, prison officials must put forth evidence in order for custom-
ary judicial deference to operate. In other words, deference is not a sub-
stitute for evidence itself. As one circuit court noted, prison officials are
"to take the unremarkable step of providing an explanation for the
policy's restrictions that takes into account any institutional
need[s] . . . . That explanation, when it comes, will be afforded due
deference." 5 2 Prison officials, who possess unique knowledge with
respect to the situations existing in their detention facilities, bear respon-
sibility to appreciably inform the courts of the specific matters taking
place under their supervision. 153
Fourth, as the U.S. Department of Justice recently has argued in a
case involving an inmate's religious objections to Alabama's prison
grooming policies, the prison's responsibility includes the duty to
inform the courts as to how its policies as applied to a specific plaintiff
or inmate are necessary to further its penological interests given the
actual circumstances within the detention facilities. The state, the
Department of Justice argued, has "the burden of showing that security,
their asserted compelling interest, is actually furthered by ban-
ning . . . specific Plaintiffs from having long hair.""'
Fifth, a vast majority of jurisdictions, including the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, either do not have restrictive grooming policies or grant
religious exemptions to inmates despite possessing the same penological
interests as the jurisdictions within the Eleventh Circuit.' 5 This begs the
question why it is necessary for the jurisdictions in the Eleventh Circuit
to maintain their restrictive grooming policies if most jurisdictions allow
inmates with relevant religious beliefs to be clean-shaven and grow their
hair.156
152. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Department of Justice
Thunderhorse Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 9 ("Once a defendant has offered such evidence,
courts have granted due deference to the expertise brought to bear in formulating the prison's
policies.").
153. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-99 (noting lack of evidence in the record for prison officials'
diminishment of prisoner rights).
154. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 25, at 8; see also Department of
Justice Thunderhorse Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 9 (RLUIPA requires prison officials to "do
more to justify the imposition of a substantial burden on religious exercise than rely on
speculation or unjustified fears," specifically they must "offer evidence . . . explaining how the
imposition of an identified substantial burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and
why it is the least restrictive means of doing so, with reference to the circumstances presented by
an individual case."); Department of Justice Garner Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 12 ("[P]rison
officials must rely on sound evidence, and not assumptions and stereotypes. The government's
record evidence must consist of more than conclusory statements that a prison policy is the least
restrictive means to further compelling governmental interests.").
155. See infra Appendix B.
156. See Department of Justice Thunderhorse Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 14-15 ("[W]hen
there is evidence in the record that different prison systems . . . provide exemptions to a rule that
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Finally, prison officials may not punish or, under the guise of
incentivizing compliance with prison regulations, condition the availa-
bility of privileges and benefits on inmates' willingness to abandon their
religious practices-to do so is to effectively discipline inmates for prac-
ticing their faith.' This general point of law has been affirmed by the
United States in federal cases in the context of inmate grooming
standards.15 1
The Eleventh Circuit's general approach to religious freedom chal-
lenges to inmate grooming standards, if continued, would violate the
collective force of these basic principles. More specifically, the court
would be susceptible to charges of excessively deferring to the states'
explanations for their grooming policies by not recognizing that relig-
ious exemptions flow logically from medical exemptions, by not taking
heed of the fact that a vast majority of other jurisdictions are able to
satisfy the same penological concerns without restrictive grooming poli-
cies or with religious exemptions, and by condoning the states' failure to
provide specific evidence tied to the inmates in question that the groom-
ing policies are necessary to further their particular penological interests.
It, consequently, would be credited with allowing the state to subject
inmates to punishment as a direct price for following the commands of
their faith. As a result of these shortcomings, the court would be said to
not fulfill its central obligation to safeguard inmates' religious rights.
If allowed to stand, the Eleventh Circuit's jurisprudence would
enable prison officials to bypass liability by merely restating their peno-
logical interests and without providing the courts with particularized
information substantiating these interests. Meanwhile, inmates with sin-
cere religious convictions, unable to reach the courts for meaningful
judicial protection, would be compelled to either accept discipline as a
condition for practicing their faith or abandon religious practices in
order to be free of punishment by prison policies.
Further clarification as to the deficiencies of the Eleventh Circuit's
existing approach is appropriate. As RLUIPA provides the most height-
ened protection for the religious rights of inmates and would be the pri-
imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise or otherwise utilize less restrictive means of
furthering their interests, the courts of appeals [have] properly require[d] defendants to explain
why they cannot adopt those less restrictive practices.") This is a question that the Eleventh
Circuit has not, however, asked in the wake of RLUIPA, and the states within its reach have been
relieved thereby of having to show why its particular circumstances necessitate the restrictive
grooming policies. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
157. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("[T]o condition the availability of
benefits upon [an individual's] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes" the individual's religious freedom).
158. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
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mary basis for an inmate's suit challenging restrictive grooming policies,
this statute is the focus of the remainder of the discussion.
B. Impact of Medical Exemptions on Inmate Grooming Policies
Under RLUIPA, the government must demonstrate that its groom-
ing policies are in service of a "compelling governmental interest."l 59
Each of the states in the Eleventh Circuit grants exemptions to the
grooming policies for medical reasons.160 As noted above, states'
restrictive grooming policies are justified by several interests, namely
identification, security, hygiene, and order.16 '
These penological interests are undermined by allowing inmates
with medical needs to have unshorn hair or beards of a length longer
than that permitted of inmates with certain religious beliefs. Indeed,
writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, then-Judge
Samuel J. Alito wrote that the government's rationale for a no-beards
policy was undercut, as the policy contained a medical exemption: "We
are at a loss to understand why religious exemptions threaten important
city interests but medical exemptions do not."' 62 A federal court simi-
larly determined that state prison officials did not carry the burden of
demonstrating a compelling penological interest where the plaintiff
sought, for religious reasons, to maintain a beard of the same length
already permitted for inmates with medical needs. 63
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(1) (2000). There can be no doubt that these grooming policies
may substantially burden the exercise of an inmate's religion, a threshold requirement under
RLUIPA as the shaving or cutting of hair may be forbidden by an inmate's religious beliefs. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 71, 73, 76 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. It should be noted that while the Eleventh
Circuit has credited prison official's testimony "that identification of escaped inmates was made
more difficult where the inmate had grown long hair and a beard because the inmate might appear
substantially different with long hair and a beard than he did when he was last photographed,"
Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1506 n.24 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1012
(1988), others have not viewed identification and permissive grooming policies to be
incompatible. See Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 481 (D. Ariz. 1995) (observing that the
concern that an inmate may change appearance and evade identification with lax grooming
policies can be "easily rectified."). Alaska, for example, re-photographs inmates as a matter of
policy, ostensibly proving that it does not find this process too onerous as a practical matter. See
State Grooming Standards at I (ed. Rev. Ulli Klemm, Administrator, Religion & Volunteer
Services, Bureau of Inmate Services, Pa. Dep't of Corr.) (Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with author) ("If
a prisoner drastically changes his or her appearance, e.g., changing hair length or color, shaving,
or growing a beard or mustache, the individual shall be re- photographed for purposes of
identification.").
162. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 367 (3d
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999).
163. See Luckette, 883 F. Supp. at 480; see also Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four:
Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA'S Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 501, 549 (2005) ("Allowing prisoners to grow beards for medical reasons, which also
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The proposition that a state's proffered penological interests may
be undermined by other relevant circumstances is not foreign to consti-
tutional law or to protected rights in particular. For example, the United
States Jaycees, a non-profit organization that promotes individual young
men's civic organizations, challenged a requirement that it admit women
as regular members.16 4 Despite the Jaycees' argument that the exclusion
of women from membership was necessary, the Supreme Court pointed
out that "women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, par-
ticipate in selected projects, and engage in many of the organization's
social functions."' 6 5 "[N]umerous non-members of both genders regu-
larly participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the deci-
sion of many members to associate with one another, including many of
the organization's various community programs, awards ceremonies,
and recruitment meetings," the Court added.' 6 6 In short, the Court con-
cluded, "[M]uch of the activity central to the formation and maintenance
of the association involves the participation of strangers to that relation-
ship."' 67 In a separate, earlier case, the Court held that a state nursing
college's interest in limiting degree-eligible students to women was
"fatally undermine[d]" by the fact that men were permitted to attend and
audit classes at the same college.' 6 8 Here, by the same token, the states'
interests in maintaining restrictive grooming policies are difficult to
square with the fact that the states provide medical exemptions for their
inmates.
To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly addressed whether
medical exemptions to restrictive grooming policies support inmates'
Free Exercise claims. In deciding that an inmate was not entitled under
law to grow his beard at the same length as that permitted for inmates
receiving medical exemptions, the court in Martinelli noted, first, that
"inmates with one-quarter inch beards present a greater security risk
than inmates without beards."' 6 9 But the same rationale-that facial hair
equals a security risk-could be used to deny exemptions for medical
reasons, though the state nonetheless permits medical exemptions.
poses the potential of doing appreciable damage to the interest of preventing contraband from
being hidden in facial hair, fatally undermines [the state's] assertion that denying [inmates] the
ability to grow a [shorter] beard serves a compelling interest.").
164. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1984).
165. Id. at 621.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
169. Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1507 (1 Ith Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S..1012
(1988); accord Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It is certainly not irrational to
believe that a full beard, which may well extend for significant lengths sideways from the cheeks
as well as downwards from the chin, may impede identification more than a one-inch beard.").
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Accordingly, the possibility that inmates with facial hair are a greater
security risk is not an absolute bar to legitimate exemptions.
The court additionally stated that "[e]vidence before the magistrate
indicated that in prisons without shaving and hair length regulations,
inmates had been caught with contraband or weapons hidden in their
long hair."17 0 By this logic, that some inmates have hid contraband or
weapons in long hair should serve as justification for denying a medical
exemption to other inmates, even if those inmates requesting a medical
exemption were not the inmates who were caught with contraband or
weapons in their hair. There is no indication, however, that medical
exemptions are denied if some other inmates have hid contraband or
weapons in their hair. It is difficult to understand why this evidence can
be used against individuals who seek religious exemptions, but ignored
with respect to those needing medical exemptions. Moreover, the num-
ber of inmates who have medical exemptions-about 25% at the penal
institution at issue in Martinelli"'7 -is not insignificant, and further
draws into question the veracity of the state's purported need to deny
religious-based exemptions to restrictive grooming standards. Finally, as
the Department of Justice has argued, it is not enough that the state show
that some inmates with beards or long hair have presented security
risks-rather, the state must prove that "specific Plaintiffs" must be spe-
cially regulated due to security threats they pose from maintaining facial
hair or growing long hair.17 2 A generalized, guilt-by-association defense
of restrictive grooming standards, in other words, should not be suffi-
cient. Indeed, it is not for medical exemptions. Particularized evidence
tied to the plaintiffs seeking a religious exemption can give rise to the
denial of a religious exemption."'
170. Martinelli. 817 F.2d at 1506 n.23; accord Iron Hines v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 148 F.3d 353,
359 (4th Cir. 1998) (denying relief under RLUIPA in light of "overwhelming" evidence that the
policies were addressing "actual dangerous situations" of some inmates, but not the plaintiffs, that
"had arisen" in that state's prisons).
171. See Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1502 n. I1 ("Testimony before the magistrate indicated that
about 160 of the 647 inmates at the [Dade Correctional Institution] were permitted to grow beards
up to one-quarter inch in length for medical reasons.").
172. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 25, at 8.
173. A possible counterargument is that the prison facilities may fairly secure their penological
interests based solely on the conduct of others, even if the inmates requesting religious
accommodations are not themselves implicated by this conduct. This line of thinking would be
attractive if it were convincing that penological concerns are the starting point for a balancing of
interests. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1987) (indicating that prison
management and judicial deference to prison officials are the touchstone for an analysis of
individual rights claims filed by inmates). There is reason to be concerned with the automatic,
significant deference that O'Lone invites. It seems to me that the baseline should be the rights of
the inmates, as individual rights presuppose government and these rights are of the American
sovereign, the people. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) ("[T]he people are the only
legitimate fountain of power"); THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison) ("[A]ll power should be
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The Eleventh Circuit's second point in Martinelli with respect to
the relevance of medical exemptions as to religious exemptions is that
the plaintiff in the case did not argue that trimming his beard would be
permitted under his religion."' Thus, the court reasoned, because the
plaintiff did not assert that "cutting his beard at the skin is a greater
violation of his religious beliefs than cutting his beard one-quarter of an
inch from his skin," the court need not grant a religious exemption for
the same one-quarter inch beard length that is permitted under a medical
exemption."' While it may be true for some inmates that trimming is
prohibited by their faith and as a result an "all-or-nothing" option is
before the courts, there are inmates whose religious beliefs permit trim-
ming, including the one-quarter inch beard denied by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. 17 6 In any case, as will be argued in the next section, states within
the Eleventh Circuit should not-in light of the overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions that are able to meet the same interests without resorting
to restrictive grooming policies or denying religious exemptions-be
permitted to impose restrictive grooming policies on inmates with rele-
vant religious beliefs in the absence of particularized evidence that the
inmates in question pose risks to the penological interests.
Third, and last, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "the existence of the
medical exemption does not in any way defeat [the state's] claimed
interests in support of the shaving and hair length regulations," adding
that the exemption is "granted only where the staff physician determines
derived from the people"); THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison) ("[T]he ultimate
authority . . . resides in the people alone"); see also THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 65 (Penguin
Books ed., 1986) (1776) (reminding the reader that pre-formal society exists prior to structured
government, though it is common to conflate the two). It is true that "[w]hen one becomes a
member of [organized] society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an
individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain," Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
124 (1876), and that individual rights are further diminished in the penal context, see supra note
19 and accompanying text. Even if the individual cedes some of his natural rights to the
government and if the scope of these rights is further relinquished as a function of incarceration, it
does not change the fact that the residual rights, what remains, had their origins prior to
government and are held by the sovereign. These rights should be the focus of cases and legal
analyses in the religious freedom and inmate grooming context. In addition, to the degree that
rights are diminished in a particular context, the courts exist and are instructed to protect
individual rights against majoritarian overreaching, a duty that is not contingent on setting. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Framed in this light, a restriction on religious
rights premised solely on prison fear tied to the behavior of other inmates, and not only the actions
of the individual inmates at issue, seems problematic for placing emphasis on official as opposed
to substantive rights, and seems inconsistent with the role of courts in our system.
174. See Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1507 ("Martinelli has at no point argued that a short, trimmed
beard would be better than no beard at all.").
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 481 (D. Ariz. 1995); Monroe v. Bombard,
422 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).
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that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's health.""' A religious
exemption, like a medical exemption, is subject to a threshold inquiry as
to whether the religious belief supporting the religious-based need for
hair is sincere. "[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a
prisoner's religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommoda-
tion, is authentic," the Supreme Court stated recently." That is, a pre-
liminary barrier to relief is present in both instances. And while the
penological interests may exist despite the allowance of medical exemp-
tions, as argued above, those interests may fairly be said to be under-
mined by the exemptions themselves."'
These considerations may give the Eleventh Circuit pause as to the
relevance of medical exemptions on the legality, under RLUIPA, of
restrictive grooming policies as applied to inmates with religious beliefs
requiring adherents to maintain beards or grow long hair.'
C. Impact of Other Jurisdictions' Permissive Grooming Policies
The previous section suggests that exemptions provided to inmates
for medical reasons cut against states' interests as applied to individuals
seeking religious exemptions to the same restrictive grooming policies,
and introduces the proposition that the denial of religious-based exemp-
tions must be based on particularized evidence that the plaintiffs at issue
present a specific risk to a compelling penological interest. In this sec-
tion, I add a layer to my argument by asserting that religious exemptions
are not necessary as the justifications for restrictive grooming policies
177. Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1507.
178. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005).
179. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
180. The Eleventh Circuit found significant testimony from a prison official "that whenever
special exemptions are granted to prison rules, other inmates who have not been granted an
exemption may feel resentment toward those receiving special treatment, resulting in friction
between inmates." Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1506 n.23. To the extent this is true, and the court
opined it is without any citation to further evidence, see id. at 1507, this would seem to be a
reason to eliminate the restrictive grooming policies and thereby eliminate the exemption regime
altogether. All inmates should be equal in terms of grooming, in other words. In any case, a
speculative belief that inmates "may" feel resentment is not a concrete reason to deny a religious
accommodation. See generally Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996)
("[H]ypothetical morale problems are clearly insufficient" to defend against a religious
accommodation); Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("Even proof that employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not
enough to establish undue hardship."). But see DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 2000)
("We think it clear that a prison's interest . . . in avoiding inmate jealousy are legitimate
penological concerns under Turner."). The Supreme Court credited prison officials' concerns that
exempting a religious group from a work detail would engender resentment towards "perceive[d]
favoritism." See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987). In this case, however,
certain religious inmates would not be exempt from some strenuous hardship imposed on all
others, but would be free-optimally with all other inmates, or at least with those who already
receive medical exemptions-to grow hair which holds special religious significance.
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themselves seem dubious in light of the fact that most other jurisdictions
do not have such policies or grant religious exemptions despite having
the same penological interests. Courts previously have sought to assess
the extent to which jurisdictions have permitted, or prohibited, inmates
from maintaining facial hair or growing long hair. A district court in
1977, for example, found that, of forty-five states that responded to the
court's survey, twenty-two states had restrictive grooming policies while
twenty-one states allowed beards in all of their institutions and two
allowed beards in some of their institutions.'
Today, however, the situation is much different. In contrast to the
rough split between states that have restrictive grooming policies and
states with permissive policies respecting grooming, my research assist-
ants have discovered that forty-one jurisdictions (thirty-nine states, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the District of Columbia) now have per-
missive grooming policies, and only eleven have restrictive grooming
policies.' It bears noting that the permissive policies are not mono-
lithic: in general, some expressly note, without qualification, that
inmates may grow their hair in accordance with their personal prefer-
ences 1; some expressly entitle inmates to grow their hair in accordance
with their religious beliefs'; and others do not have appearance restric-
tions but mention the prison interests, such as security and hygiene, that
facilities nonetheless reserve in the event of a breach. 8 5 On the other
end of the spectrum, eleven jurisdictions possess restrictive policies that
set forth express limits on hair growth or beard length, and that do not
supply religious exemptions to such policies. 8 6
The degree to which jurisdictions now permit inmates to have
beards or grow long hair, as compared to those which do not, clearly and
substantially favors the former jurisdictions and inmates with religious
beliefs that require adherents to maintain unshorn hair. The situation has
transformed on a state-by-state level. It is also fluid, and is moving spe-
cifically in the direction of permissive jurisdictions. For example, one of
181. See Martinelli, 817 F.2d at 1506 n.26 (discussing Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp.
947 (D. Conn. 1977)).
182. See Appendix B, infra.
183. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 551.2 (2012).
184. See, e.g., ARIz. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE REGS. §704.02 (2010), available at http://www.
azcorrections.gov/Policies/700/0704.pdf.
185. See, e.g., N.H. DEP'T OF CORR. POLICY AND PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE, SAFEGUARDING OF





186. The Alabama, Florida, and Georgia policies, discussed in Part LB, supra, are
representative examples of such policies.
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the states with the largest number of inmates, California, with 144,000
incarcerated individuals,18 7 agreed in 2011 to no longer enforce and
change an existing policy that "prohibit[ed] inmates from wearing facial
hair that extends more than one-half inch in length from the face.""
Califomia thus joins the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which houses over
208,000 inmates'8 9 under a permissive regime.' 9 0 The Federal Bureau of
Prisons thus "manage[s] the largest correctional system in the
Nation . .. without compromising prison security, public safety, or the
constitutional rights of other prisoners."9' As a vast majority of juris-
dictions, including the largest, allow inmates to grow their hair consis-
tent with their personal preferences or religious tradition, Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia's general justifications for their restrictive groom-
ing policies lose their legal force and factual support.
In reviewing a Native American inmate's RLUIPA claim challeng-
ing California's then-restrictive grooming policies, the Ninth Circuit in
2005 pointed out that the state did not explain why prison systems with
permissive grooming policies "are able to meet their indistinguishable
interests without infringing on their inmates' right to freely exercise
their religious beliefs." 92 This question compelled the Ninth Circuit to
rule for the inmate. The same question, which attains greater weight in
light of California's recent abandonment of its restrictive grooming poli-
cies, applies to the states within the Eleventh Circuit. This question,
which the Ninth Circuit placed on California in the context of RLUIPA
litigation, must be asked by the Eleventh Circuit of the states within its
purview, to the extent that a similar claim of religious freedom is raised
by an inmate subject to a policy that limits his or her ability to grow
facial hair or long hair.
To be sure, this is not to advocate for a one-size-fits-all approach to
prison management as it concerns religious freedom and grooming stan-
dards.'93 Detention facilities invariably have varying penological con-
187. Medina, supra note 26, at A14.
188. Basra Settlement, supra note 27, at 4, 9-10.
189. The number of prisoners for each of the listed jurisdictions, except for California and the
District of Columbia, is reproduced from the Pew Prison Count report, supra note 28.
190. 28 C.F.R. § 551.2 (2012).
191. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
192. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Department of
Justice Garner Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 12 ("A prison's claim that a specific restriction on
religious exercise is the least restrictive means of advancing compelling governmental interests is
significantly undermined by evidence that many other prisons, with the same compelling interests,
allow the practice at issue.").
193. See generally Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (criticizing a case which "led
to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons" and reiterating the
preferred policy of federal courts "to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials
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cerns.' 94 The unique circumstances in a prison facility or jurisdiction
may ostensibly justify a departure from the general rule that restrictive
grooming standards are not needed to meet compelling penological
interests such as security or order. The question becomes when a given
jurisdiction can properly deviate from the general rule.
As may be evident from the discussion thus far, a generalized, con-
clusory statement as to the importance of the prison officials' penologi-
cal interests is insufficient to restrict an inmate's ability to grow a beard
or long hair in accordance with his or her faith. As several circuit courts
have noted, "[T]he state may not merely reference an interest in security
or institutional order in order to justify its actions"1 9 5 ; "Even in light of
the substantial deference given to prison authorities, the mere assertion
of security or health reasons is not, by itself, enough for the Government
to satisfy the compelling governmental interest requirement"l 9 6 ;
"[M]erely stating a compelling interest does not fully satisfy [State]'s
burden on this element of RLUIPA"' 9 7 ; and "[t]he prison administration
cannot avoid court scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions."' 9 8 For the
courts to accept such general assertions by prison officials as to peno-
logical interests would be to invite courts to merely "rubber stamp or
mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators . . . ."199 In
other words, this form of deference here would render protected relig-
ious freedom a nullity and convert the courts into instruments of state
prison policy. Such deference would allow prison officials to recite their
penological interests and claim compliance with the law in the absence
of actual judicial scrutiny.
Instead, as noted by the Seventh Circuit, "[T]he governmental
interest asserted in support of a restrictive policy must be sufficiently
articulated to allow for meaningful review of the regulation in question
and its effect on the inmate's asserted rights."2 00 This particularized
showing must be linked to the specific plaintiffs seeking to vindicate
their religious rights under the law. As the Department of Justice has
argued, "While the [state has] articulated some circumstances in which
trying to manage a volatile environment.") (cited approvingly in Parrish v. Ala. Dep't of Corr.,
156 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998)).
194. See, e.g., Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F. Supp. 2d 507, 519 (W.D. Va. 2006) (noting that
the same penological interests may be met by jurisdictions in different ways depending on their
respective "history, inmate population, structure and funding.") (citation omitted).
195. Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2009).
196. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 283 (3d Cir. 2007).
197. Spratt v. RI. Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2007).
198. Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
199. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006).
200. Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1986).
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long hair could conceivably be tied to potential security risks, they have
not cited evidence of actual or threatened security breaches caused by
nonconformity . . . with respect to these Plaintiffs."2 0 1 Without particular
evidence tied to the "specific Plaintiffs," 20 2 I suggest that the jurisdiction
may not claim that its penological interests justify the abridgment of
plaintiffs' religious rights. Accordingly, it seems to me that to the extent
that customary deference is owed to prisons, it would be tied to evidence
as to the risks associated with the specific plaintiffs or inmates bringing
a religious freedom claim or otherwise seeking to engage in bona fide
religious expression.203
D. Compliance with RLUIPA
An inmate challenging inmate grooming policies on religious
grounds would likely file suit under RLUIPA, which provides the most
heightened standard for religious freedom claims in the prison con-
text. 2 1 RLUIPA mandates that where a state substantially burdens an
inmate's sincere religious practice, the state must prove that the groom-
ing policies are the "least restrictive means" to achieve a compelling
penological interest.205 As argued above, the existence of medical
exemptions undermines the compelling state interests that may be
advanced by the state. 206 And many states, as noted above, are able to
operate prisons without restrictive grooming policies or with religious
exemptions.207 Particularized evidence that the specific inmates present
threatened or actual security risks may, however, rebut this presumption
201. See Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 25, at 9 (emphasis added). As to
"threatened" security risks, language in Turner suggests that prison officials need not respond
only after the fact and can "anticipate security problems . . . ." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987). The policies, whether reactive or anticipatory, must nonetheless have some evidentiary
basis. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190 (requiring prison officials to elaborate and present evidence
on its restrictive policies and rejecting their superficial explanations).
202. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 25, at 8.
203. The Court has explained that "[p]rison administrators [are to be] accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). The Court later clarified that this deference "requires that neither judge
nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice."
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986). A rule which entitles prison officials to significant
deference as to evidence of specific threats to compelling institutional interests as to the inmates
seeking release from restrictive grooming policies seems to be consistent with this statement by
the Court.
204. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation:
The Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 1907, 1922 (2011) ("RLUIPA ... offers much more
robust protection for religious exercise than the Constitution demands for those activities.").
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(2) (2000).
206. See supra Part IV.B.
207. See supra Part III.C. States that create religious exemptions or that remove restrictive
grooming policies may nonetheless further their interests in security by regularly inspecting
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and entitle a prison to subject the prisoner to restrictive grooming
policies.2 08
Two other considerations are relevant on this score. First, the
courts have made it clear that inmates cannot be forced to choose
between following their faith and receiving punishment from prisons on
one hand, and violating the commands of their faith and avoiding pun-
ishment on the other. As Judge Guido Calabresi stated, "Precedent sug-
gests that inmates have a right not to be disciplined for refusing to
perform tasks that violate their religious beliefs."2 09 More directly, the
Department of Justice has maintained that RLUIPA does not permit
prison officials to discipline an inmate for refusing to comply with a
prison's restrictive grooming policies. In particular, in the case which
settled this year in favor of a Sikh inmate who is required by his faith to
keep his hair unshorn, the Department of Justice noted that the prison's
grooming polices "compel [the inmate] to either cut his beard and vio-
late a central tenet of his religion or suffer increasingly severe penalties,
including the deprivation of privileges . . . in violation of [his] RLUIPA
rights."2"o The Department of Justice explained that it participated in the
case to obtain "an order under RLUIPA requiring the defendants to
allow [the inmate] to wear his facial hair unshorn without penalty."2 1 '
As the government contends, RLUIPA entitles an inmate to adhere to his
faith without the prospect or receipt of punishment.
The states within the Eleventh Circuit, however, subject inmates to
discipline for failing to comply with facilities' restrictive grooming poli-
cies.2 12 In other words, inmates must either follow the strictures of their
respective religions or be forced to abandon their religious beliefs by
threat of punishment. The states thus present inmates with the precise
Hobson's Choice that RLUIPA prohibits.2 13
inmates' hair. Alaska, for example, requires its staff to "routinely search prisoners' hair for
contraband" as a matter of policy. Klemm, supra note 161, at 1.
208. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
209. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
210. Complaint in Intervention Pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (Civil Rights), Basra v. Cate, No. CVI 1-01676 SVW, 4 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 15, 2011). See also Basra Settlement, supra note 27.
211. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., No. 45, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN Focus (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec-topics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletter/focus_45.
html (emphasis added).
212. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.101(5) (2012); GA. COMP. R. & REGs. 125-3-2-
.04(g)(3)-(5) (2010); Corbett 12/13/11 Email, supra note 77.
213. See Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1325 (10th Cir. 2010) (commenting on an
inmate who "has been forced to choose between violating his religious beliefs and starving to
death. Whatever else might be said about RLUIPA, redressing this sort of Hobson's choice surely
lies at its heart.").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Second, courts hearing RLUIPA claims have held that restrictive
grooming policies are not the "least restrictive means" required under
the statute. That is, courts faced with religious-based challenges to
restrictive inmate grooming polices have endorsed religious exemptions
as a viable solution to the conflict between individuals' religious rights
and prisons' penological interests. For example, the Ninth Circuit noted
that "one alternative to [the prison's] rigid policy would be the creation
of a religious exemption to the grooming policy."2 14 The Second Circuit
similarly held that "we find that there exists an alternative means of
accommodating plaintiffs' religious rights without undermining the
legitimate penological interests identified by the [state]," specifically
permitting the plaintiffs-inmates "to regrow their hair to any length after
the initial haircut [upon arrival]."215 A federal district court also decided
that "the failure to provide a religious exemption for Plaintiffs beard in
the [state's] grooming policy violates RLUIPA,"2 16 while another con-
cluded that the state should be enjoined from "preventing Plaintiff from
growing a one quarter inch beard."217
Accordingly, despite its rulings in Harris and Brunskill, the Elev-
enth Circuit would be well-advised to reconsider whether RLUIPA
requires states to, at a minimum, create a religious exemption to their
grooming policies identical or similar to their medical exemption. It is
plausible to suggest, given the more recent rulings of federal courts, that
states should no longer be permitted to hold on to their restrictive
grooming policies under the theory, validated by Harris and subse-
quently followed in Brunskill, that they are the "least restrictive means"
to furthering their penological interests.218
To be sure, some courts have suggested that creating a religious
exemption would lead to a flood of inmates seeking exemptions for
religious reasons. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, claimed that "[t]he
number of inmates warranting a medical exemption to the grooming pol-
icy is quite small, but the number of inmates likely to seek qualification
for a religious exception would be much greater."219 A district court also
expressed concern that "[t]he rate of religious 'conversion' would no
doubt multiply exponentially, and segregation units would have little
214. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005).
215. Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 577 (2d Cir. 1990).
216. Smith v. Beauclair, No. CV-03-222-C-EJL, 2006 WL 2348073, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 11,
2006).
217. Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D. Ariz. 1995).
218. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Where a prisoner challenges
[a prison's] justifications, prison officials must set forth detailed evidence, tailored to the situation
before the court, that identifies the failings in the alternatives advanced by the prisoner.")
(emphasis added).
219. Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
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need of a barber." 220
These courts' worries, however, are speculative and without an evi-
dentiary basis. As noted above, the Federal Bureau of Prisons and a vast
majority of states do not have restrictive grooming policies or have
exemptions premised on religious belief. These jurisdictions have not
reported or seemed to be besieged by problems associated with allowing
inmates to grow their facial hair or maintain long hair for religious pur-
poses, nor is there any indication that the states within the Eleventh Cir-
cuit themselves have these problems. Accordingly, a fear of a wave of
inmates seeking religious exemptions need not preclude states from
granting religious exemptions, as argued in this section, or from remov-
ing the restrictive grooming policies altogether, as suggested in previous
sections.
To summarize and repeat, a court hearing a RLUIPA claim con-
testing the legality of restrictive inmate grooming policies should first
inquire as to whether the plaintiff has proven that he or she has a sin-
cerely held religious belief that compels him or her to grow a beard or
maintain long hair; if this threshold is met, it can be safely assumed that
a restrictive grooming policy requiring the cutting or shaving of hair
substantially burdens the religious practice of that inmate. The state's
penological interests undergirding the policies, such as security and
order, are likely to be found to be compelling. The court should, how-
ever, probe the state as to why the existence of medical exemptions does
not undermine these proffered interests. It should also ask why restric-
tive grooming policies applied to inmates with relevant religious prac-
tices are necessary, given the fact that a vast and growing majority of
jurisdictions do not have such policies or affirmatively grant religious
exemptions, despite having the same underlying penological interests.
The state may satisfactorily defend its restrictive grooming policies by
showing a particularized evidentiary basis, which is entitled to due def-
erence, for why the specific inmate in question poses an actual or
threatened risk to a compelling penological interest.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explores the intersection of the right of inmates to
grow beards or maintain long hair in accordance with their faith, on one
hand, and the ability of prison facilities to serve their penological inter-
ests by implementing and enforcing restrictive grooming policies that
require inmates to shave or trim beards, or cut hair, on the other. In
particular, this Article examines the Eleventh Circuit's resolution of
220. Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F. Supp. 2d 507, 519 (W.D. Va. 2006).
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cases implicating this tension between religious freedom and prison
management. Each of the states within the Eleventh Circuit has restric-
tive grooming policies. In choosing between inmates' religious freedom
and these states' interests, the Eleventh Circuit has routinely sided with
prisons. It has done so by deferring to the need for restrictive grooming
policies, eschewing the impact of medical exemptions to these policies
on the legal viability and practical propriety of religious exemptions to
the same policies, and by not taking into account the significant and
growing number of jurisdictions that do not have restrictive grooming
policies or that grant religious exemptions despite sharing the same
penological concerns.
This Article argues for an alternative approach to the one that the
Eleventh Circuit has historically adopted. More specifically, I call for a
standard in which restrictive grooming policies may not be imposed on
inmates with religious beliefs that require followers to wear beards or
have long hair under RLUIPA, unless there is evidence of actual or
threatened risks to compelling penological interests as to the specific
plaintiffs or inmates in question. This approach is more searching and is
reflective of the fact that forty-one jurisdictions permit inmates to grow
beards or have long hair for religious reasons, including the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and California, and of the view that medical exemp-
tions undermine the penological interests that justify the application of
restrictive grooming policies to inmates with religious beliefs that con-
flict with the policies.
As other courts and the Department of Justice have relieved
inmates from restrictive grooming policies and maximized their relig-
ious freedom as a result, the question is whether the Eleventh Circuit's
approach, which enables states to subject inmates to limitations on relig-
ious expression, remains sustainable. This Article answers in the nega-
tive, and seeks thereby to give full meaning to the religious freedom that
lies at the core of American fundamental liberties and that survives even
in the physical and social space of penal institutions that necessarily
entail a withdrawal of some freedoms. In short, religious freedom in the
penal context, at least as it pertains to grooming policies, is moving
towards an enlargement of the rights of inmates. I suggest, quite simply
and with reference to federal cases and penal policies, that the Eleventh
Circuit's jurisprudence in this area should bend in that direction as well.
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APPENDIX A: IMAGE OF ALABAMA PERSONAL
APPEARANCE POLICIES
GROOMING GUIDELINES
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1. Federal Bureau of Prisons







1. Jurisdictions Without Express Restrictions or
With Religious Exceptions to Explicit Restrictions
Applicable Policies
"An inmate may wear a mustache or beard or both. The
Warden shall require an inmate with a beard to wear a beard
covering when working in food service or where a beard
could result in increased likelihood of work injury." 222
"A prisoner must be permitted to adopt any hair style or
length, including a beard and mustache if they are kept
clean." 223
"Full beards or partial beards ... are not authorized. Excep-
tions for full beards may only be granted for medical or
religious reasons. Authorized beards shall be kept clean,
trimmed and well-groomed at all times."
224
The policy that "prohibit[ed] inmates from wearing facial
hair that extends more than onehalf inch in length from the
face" is no longer enforced and will be eliminated.226 The
state may require inmates to "maintain their facial hair in a
neat and clean manner.'227
"Beards and moustaches will be permitted provided they are
kept neat and clean." 228
"Hair shall be clean and appropriately groomed." 229
"It is the policy of the Department of Correction to require
all offenders . . . to conform to reasonable standards of
grooming and attire . . . . No personal hygiene needs shall
be denied for punitive reasons nor shall the standards con-
flict with the valid religious beliefs of offenders." 230
221. The number of prisoners for each of the listed jurisdictions, except for California and the
District of Columbia, is reproduced from the Pew Prison Count report, supra note 28
222. 28 C.F.R. § 551.2 (2011) (Mustaches and Beards).
223. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.180(c) (2011); see also ALASKA DEP'T OF CORR.,
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, SANITATION AND HYGIENE, 806.02(A) (1995), available at http://
www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/pnp/pdf/806.02.pdf ("The Alaska DOC shall give prisoners
the freedom to groom and dress as they wish as long as their appearance does not conflict with an
institution's requirements for safety, security, identification, and hygiene.").
224. ARIz. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE REGs. § 704.02(l.3) (2010), available at http://www.
azcorrections.gov/Policies/700/0704.pdf.
225. Medina, supra note 26, at A14.
226. Basra Settlement, supra note 27, at IT 4, 9-10.
227. Id. at 1 10.
228. COLo. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION, OFFENDER PERSONNEL: HYGIENE
AND GROOMING, No. 850-11 § (IV)(A)(3)(b) (2011), available at http://www.doc.state.co.us/sites/
default/files/ar/0850_1 10.pdf (citing ACA 4-4283).
229. CONN. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE, INMATE PROPERTY No. 6.10(36)(B)
(2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/adO610.pdf.
230. DEL. DEP'T OF CORR., RIGHTS OF OFFENDERS: STANDARDS FOR OFFENDER GROOMING
AND ArrIRE, No. 5.3 (2009), available at http://doc.delaware.gov/pdfs/policies/policy5-3.pdf.
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Inmates are required to "maintain an acceptable level of
personal hXtiene" and must keep themselves "clean and
sanitary."
"Hawaii does not have a department policy for grooming
standards. Our practice is to encourage inmates to shave and
keep their hair short for a number of reasons such as health
and safety, but this is not enforced. If it clearly is a health
and/or safety issue, then we deal with it on a case by case
basis. My recollection is that we were advised that unless
we could specifically state what the security concern is,
(e.g. inmates were caught hiding contraband and their hair,
specific documented health reasons, etc.) we needed to
allow it for religious reasons."23
"Committed persons may have any length of hair, side-
burns, mustaches, or beards so long as they are kept neat
and clean and do not create a security risk."
234
"Prisoners may be required to shave or cut their hair only
for sanitation."
235
"Each inmate shall keep the inmate's hair neat and clean
and follow reasonable health and safety standards . . . .
Inmates shall be allowed limited freedom in personal
grooming which shall be consistent with procedures estab-
lished to provide minimum personal appearance and
hygiene standards appropriate to ensure safety, security,
hygiene, and identification."
2 36
"An inmate may wear a mustache, beard, or both."
2 37
"Inmates can grow their hair and beards as they please
(more or less) as long as they keep it clean and neat."
238
231. D.C. DEP'T OF CORR., DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICS, AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION FOR
OCTOBER 2006 THROUGH SEPFEMBER 2011, available at http://doc.dc.gov/doc/frames.asp?doc=/
doc/lib/doc/populationstats/DemographicsvvandStatisticsOctll I.pdf.
232. D.C. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK, at 6, available at http://doc.dc.gov/docflib/
doc/program statements/4000/ps_4020.1c_orientation inmate hand book_3-7-07.pdf. Pursuant
to the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-33, § 11201(b), III Stat. 251, 735 (1995), the District has ceded custody of its inmates to
the federal government's Bureau of Prisons. The District does hold inmates "awaiting transfer to
the Federal Bureau of Prisons." D.C. DEP'T OF CORR., Frequently Asked Questions, DOC.DC.GOV,
http://doc.dc.gov/doc/cwp/view,a,3,q,619447.asp.
233. Klemm, supra note 161, at 6.
234. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 502.110(a) (2011).
235. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 201-50.14(356,356A)(3c) (2011).
236. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-12-106(a) (2011); KAN. DEP'T OF CORR., INTERNAL
MANAGEMENT POLICY & PROCEDURE, CLOTHING & LINEN ISSUE; INMATE HYGIENE AND
APPEARANCE, No. 12-129 (2010), available at http://www.doc.ks.gov/kdoc-policies/impp/chapter-
12/12129.pdf.
237. Ky. CORR., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, HAIR, GROOMING, AND ID CARD STANDARDS,
No. 15.1 § (II)(A)(1) (2010), available at http://corrections.ky.gov/nr/rdonlyres/03313af0-5c55-4e
6f-ac69-d24f64ba2662/0/151 .pdf.
238. Klemm, supra note 161, at 9.







"Inmates must be provided a reasonable choice of selection
of hair style and length and appearance (e.g., beards, mous-
taches, etc.) subject only to the need to ensure proper
hygiene, identification, and the order and security of the
facility. Such provision enhances inmate morale and
respects personal identity."
2 3 9
"Inmates may be permitted certain choices in personal
grooming, as long as their appearance does not conflict with
the institution's requirements for safety, security, identifica-
tion and hygiene."240
"Prisoners shall be encouraged to maintain a 'well
groomed' appearance . . . . Prisoners shall be permitted to
maintain head and facial hair in accordance with their per-
sonal beliefs provided that reasonable hygiene is main-
tained. Hair care services shall be offered at each . . .
institution in accordance with applicable sanitation and
health requirements." 24 1
"Hair, including facial hair and eyebrows, must be kept
clean and may not be styled or cut to contain lettering, signs
or symbols."242
"[I]ncarcerated offenders at all custody levels may have
whatever hair and beard length they prefer. 1. Any offender
may be required to cut their hair and beard and maintain
short hair and a clean shaven face for the following reasons:
a) concealing or transporting any contraband or weapon in
their hair or beard; b) refusing to promptly follow staff
directions with regard to a search of their hair or beard; c)
having a history of escape or attempted escape; d) failing to
maintain a clean and neat appearance; or e) having health,
safety, or hygiene problems related to hair or beard." 24 3
"Facilities will allow offenders freedom in personal groom-
ing as long as their appearance does not conflict with the
facility's safety, security, identification, and hygiene regula-
tions." 244
239. MD. COMM'N ON CORR. STANDARDS, STANDARDS, COMPLIANCE CRITERIA, AND
COMPLIANCE EXPLANATIONS FOR ADULT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES § .05(K),
available at http://dpscs.maryland.gov/publicinfo/publications/pdfs/u.pdf.
240. Klemm, supra note 161, at 9.
241. MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE, HUMANE TREATMENT AND LIVING
CONDITIONS FOR PRISONERS, No. 03.03.130 §§ (C)-(D) (2009) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/03 03_130_270785_7.pdf; see also BERRIEN
CNTY. JAIL, INMATE RULES AND REGULATIONS § 13 (2011), available at http://www.besheriff.org/
pdfs/26-167book.pdf.
242. MINN. DEP T OF CORR., DIVISION DIRECTIVE: OFFENDER DRESS/HYGIENEIHAIR CARE, No.
303.020 § (B)(4) (2011) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/
DocPolicy2/Document/303.020.htm.
243. Klemm, supra note 161, at 10.
244. MONT. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: OFFENDER HYGIENE, CLOTHING, AND LINEN
SUPPLIES, No. DOC 4.4.1 § (IV)(A)(2) (2011) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.cor.
mt.gov/content/Resources/Policy/Chapter4/4-4-1 -.pdf.
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21. Nebraska (4,490)
22. Nevada (12,539)
23. New Hampshire (2,731)
24. New Jersey (25,351)
25. New Mexico (6,578)
"Freedom in personal grooming. This choice is limited only
by institutional requirements for safety, security, identifica-
tion, or hygiene."245
"Male inmates may have sideburns, beards, and mous-
taches, provided they are kept clean and neat, subject to
provisions in this regulation. Beards, sideburns and mous-
taches may be required to be removed for security rea-
sons.246
"Personal grooming choices regarding appearance. The
choice is limited only by institutional requirements for: 1.
Safety; 2. Security; 3. Identification; 4. Hygiene" 247
"Inmates shall be permitted to have the hair style or length
of hair they choose, including beards and mustaches, pro-
vided their hair is kept clean and does not present a safety
hazard, or a health, sanitary or security problem. When the
length, style or condition of an inmate's hair is found to
present a safety hazard, or a health, sanitary or security
problem, the inmate shall be required to trim or cut his or
her hair or wear an appropriate protective head and/or beard
covering." 248
"Freedom in personal grooming shall be permitted except
when a valid interest justified otherwise . . . . Beards and
goatees are not permitted and no other facial hair is permit-
ted . . . . Inmates having a sincerely held religious belief
which prohibits the inmate from cutting his hair may
request an exception to the grooming standards contained
herein . . . . Inmates, for whom an exception for Sincerely
Held Religious Beliefs is granted, are required to keep the
hair clean, trimmed and neat." 24 9
245. NEB. CORR. SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: INMATE RIGHTS, No. 116.01
§ (III)(E) (2011) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.corrections.nebraska.gov/pdf/ar/
rights/AR%20116.01.pdf.
246. NEV. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: INMATE GROOMING AND PERSONAL
HYGIENE, No. 705 § 705.01(1)(A)-(B), (2010) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.
doc.nv.gov/ar/pdf/AR705.pdf.
247. N.H. DEP'T OF CORR, POLICY AND PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE: SAFEGUARDING OF RESIDENTS
IN DEPARTMENTAL FACILITIES, no. 7.30 (2003) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.
wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/reporting-and-confidentiality-doc-new-hampshire.pdf?
rd=1. But see BELKNAP CNTY. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK, at 9 ("Sentenced Inmates
must be clean-shaven at all times."), available at http://www.belknapcounty.org/pages/Belknap
County_corrections/Inmate%20Handbook.pdf.
248. N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ IOA:14-2.5(a), (b) (2011).
249. N.M. CORR. DEP'T, INMATE GROOMING AND HYGIENE, Nos. CD- 151100 § (B), CD-
151101 §§ (H)(5), (J)(1), (K)(1) (2011) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://corrections.
state.nm.us/policies/current/CD-151 100.pdf.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
26. New York (58,648)
27. North Carolina (39,871)
28. North Dakota (1,486)
29. Ohio (51,606)
30. Oklahoma (26,397)
"Any reception inmate or returned parole violator who pro-
fesses to be a Rastafarian, Taoist, Sikh, Native American,
Orthodox Jew, or member of any other religious sect of a
similar nature and refuses to have an initial haircut cannot
be forced to comply with the initial haircut requirements. In
addition, any reception inmate or parole violator who ref-
uses to comply with the initial haircut regulation on relig-
ious grounds and who has a court order restraining the
Department from enforcing the initial haircut regulation
cannot be forced or ordered to comply with the initial hair-
cut regulation . . . . An inmate may grow a beard and/or
mustache, but beard/mustache hair may not exceed one (1)
inch in length unless . . . . [tihe inmate has requested and
received an exemption based upon his or her documented
membership in a religion which has an established tenet
against the trimming of beards." 250
"[I]nmates will be required to maintain their hair in a state
of cleanliness." 25 1
"An inmate's hair length may not be restricted if it would
violate a sincerely held religious belief unless the restriction
is necessary for identification, safety, or security pur-
poses." 2 52
"Inmates shall be required to be neat and well groomed, and
otherwise conform their appearance to the standards set
forth in this rule .... Sideburns, bangs, and other facial hair
must be neatly trimmed. Facial hair must not protrude more
than one-fourth inch from the skin . . . . If the grooming
restrictions established by this rule substantially burden an
inmate's sincerely held religious belief, the inmate may
seek an appropriate exemption by applying for a religious
accomodation [sic]." 2 53
"Except when a valid interest justifies otherwise (as
described in this procedure), facilities will allow freedom in
personal grooming . . . . Thereafter, male hairstyles and
appearances, including facial hair, will not conflict with
security, sanitation, safety, or health requirements of the
department. The growing, shaving, cutting, or styling of
hair will remain in compliance with this procedure and with
conventional community standards." 254
250. N.Y. DEP'T OF CORR. SERVS., DIRECTIVE: INMATE GROOMING STANDARDS, No. 4914
§§ (I)(A)(2), (1II)(B)(1), (III)(B)(1)(b) (2010), available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/
Directives/4914.pdf.
251. N.C. DEP'T OF CORR. Div. OF PRISONS, CLOTHING, BEDDING, & PERSONAL HYGIENE:
POLICY AND PROCEDURES, Ch. E .2100, § .2106 (2010), available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/
dop/policy-proceduremanual/E2100.pdf.
252. N.D. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., NORTH DAKOTA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY RULES
PREPARED BY THE NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Rule 69,
http://www.nd.gov/docr/county/inspections.html (last visited February 26, 2012).
253. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-25.1(A), (F), (P) (2011).
254. OKLA. DEP'T OF CORR., PERSONAL HYGIENE AND APPEARANCE CODE, No. OP-030501
§§ (III), (III)(A)(2), (III)(A)(2)(a) (2011) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.doc.
state.ok.us/offtechlop03050l.pdf.
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31. Oregon (14,404)
32. Pennsylvania (51,429)
33. Rhode Island (3,674)





39. West Virginia (6,367)
"Head and facial hair must be maintained daily in a clean
and neat manner."
2 5 5
"Hairstyles of different types will be permitted provided
they do not conflict with the facility's procedures for safety,
security, identification, and sanitation efforts .. .. A beard
or goatee no longer than three inches; a mustache and side-
burns shall be permitted provided they are kept neat and
clean .... An inmate [may] request ... a hairstyle exemp-
tion based on religion ."
No stated policy257
"Hair must be kept clean and neat in appearance and cannot
pose a safety or sanitation threat in your work or program
assignment."2 58
"Inmates shall be permitted freedom in personal grooming
and dress as long as their appearance does not conflict with
the institution's requirements for safety, security, identifica-
tion, sanitation, and hygiene."259
"An inmate may wear a mustache or beard or both. An
inmate with a beard shall wear a beard covering when par-
ticipating in food service programs or where a beard could
result in increased likelihood of injury." 260
"There is no grooming policy for the inmate population
unless it is a health risk; at that point, our medical staff
intervene with doctor's orders."
2 6
"Offenders will be permitted freedom in personal grooming
as long as their appearance does not conflict with the facil-
ity's requirements for safety, security, identification, and
hygiene."
2 6 2
"Facial hair will not be permitted. Medical and religious
issues will be addressed on a case by case basis." 263
255. OR. ADMIN. R. 291-123-0015(2)(a) (2011).
256. PA. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY STATEMENT: INMATE GROOMING AND BARBER/
COSMETOLOGY PROGRAMS, No. DC-ADM 807 §§ (A)(1), (A)(2)(b), (A)(2)(d) (2011), available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/porta/server.pt/document/919466/807 inmate hygiene-and
grooming.pdf.
257. Telephone Interview by Douglas Spoerl with Gina Caruolo, Chief Program Dev., R.I.
Dep't of Corr., (June 15, 2011).
258. S.D. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE LIVING GUIDE, Personal Cleanliness and Grooming, at 7
(Sept. 22, 2011), available at http://doc.sd.gov/documents/InmateLivingGuide-201 I_000.pdf.
259. TENN. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: HAIRSTYLEs/DRESS
CODE/GROOMING, No. 502.03 § (V) (2006) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.tn.gov/
correction/pdf/502-03.pdf.
260. Email from Steve Gehrke, Pub. Info. Officer, Utah Dep't of Corr., to Douglas Spoerl (Jun
1, 2011 at 18:25 PM EST).
261. Email from William Lawhorn, Dir., Facility Operations, Vt. Dep't of Corr., to Douglas
Spoerl (Jun 15, 2011, 16:22 PM EST).
262. WASH. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY: HYGIENE AND GROOMING FOR OFFENDERS, No. DOC
440.080 (2009) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.doc.wa.gov/policies/showFile.
aspxname=440080.
263. W. VA. Div. OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE: INMATE GROOMING STANDARDS, No. 334.01
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
40. Wisconsin (23,112)
41. Wyoming (2,075)
"The department has the authority to regulate the length of
hair, mustaches, and beards based upon institution health
and safety concerns."
264
"Head and facial hair may be kept at any natural length pro-
vided that it is kept clean and neat in appearance at all
times, does not present an undue risk to health, and is able
to be searched."
2. Jurisdictions with Explicit Restrictions without Religious Exceptions




"[Inmates] are expected to maintain a good personal appear-
ance. Male inmates are expected to be clean shaven and
neat. Mustaches and beards are not permitted. There is
opportunity for haircuts so [inmates] can keep [their] hair
well-groomed. Barbers are instructed in regard to proper
haircuts and are not permitted to give special haircuts. Side-
burns may be worn medium length and extended no longer
than the middle of the ear."266
"[Inmates may be exempted from these policies for medical
reasons] based on the [decision of the state's] physician.
[Exemptions] are normally issued for a certain length of
time. In the case of shaving, the inmate will not be allowed
to have hair longer than an 1/8th of an inch." 267
"The hair of a male resident must be worn loose and cut so
as to be above the ear, with sideburns no lower than the
middle of the ear lobe, and no longer in the back than the
nape of the neck . . . . The wearing of facial hair is a privi-
lege. When this privilege is requested and granted by the
clinical staff, only a neatly trimmed mustache that does not
extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the lip is
authorized. Medical staff may prescribe that residents with
diagnosed dermatological problems ma wear facial hair no
longer than one quarter of an inch." 26
§ (V)(A)(2) (2007) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.wvdoc.com/wvdoc/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=5V9gWxkSaoxo%3D&tabid=104&mid=156.
264. Wis. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 309.24(3)(b) (2011).
265. Wyo. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY AND PROCEDURE: INMATE GROOMING, HYGIENE, AND
SANITATION, No. 4.201 § (IV)(D)(5) (2006), available at http://corrections.wy.gov/Media.aspx?
mediald=37.
266. Corbett 11/7/11 Email, supra note 75. These Alabama personal appearance policies also
contain a visual depiction of these grooming requirements. See supra Appendix A.
267. Corbett 12/5/11 Email, supra note 76.
268. ARK. DEP'T OF CMTY. CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE: PERSONAL CLEANLINESS &
GROOMING FOR RESIDENTS, No. 98-06 § (III)(B), (C) (1998), available at http://www.dcc.
arkansas.gov/pdfs/policies/personalclean.pdf.
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Male inmates shall have their hair cut short to medium uni-
form length at all times with no part of the ear or collar
covered. Male inmates shall be permitted to shave their
entire heads in a uniform manner unless the inmate is using
his hairstyle or lack thereof to demonstrate gang affiliation
or otherwise pose a threat to institutional secur-
ity . . . . Sideburns shall not extend beyond the bottom of
the earlobes and will have straight lines with no flare at the
base. All inmates shall be clean shaven, with the exception
of [certain] inmates [with mental health classifica-
tions] . . . . Additionally an exemption from the requirement
to remain clean shaven shall be granted on the basis of a
medical diagnosis when it is determined by the staff physi-
cian that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's
health. Inmates granted a medical exemption from the shav-
ing requirement may be required to keep their facial hair
closely trimmed with scissors or clippers. For the purposes
of this rule, 'closely trimmed' means trimmed so that no
part of the facial hair exceeds the length prescribed by the
physician as necessary to prevent the appearance or reap-
pearance of skin disorders. If no specific length is pre-
scribed, then facial hair shall be kept trimmed to within one-
quarter inch." 2
6 9
"Each inmate shall have a conventional haircut. Hair shall
not be longer than three (3) inches; shall not extend beyond
a point which would reach the collar on an ordinary shirt;
and shall not cover any part of the ears or eyebrows.
Inmates may wear sideburns no longer than a point even
with the bottom of the ear canal. Mustaches are permitted,
but shall not extend beyond the edge of the mouth and must
be kept neat and trimmed at all times. Goatees, beards, and
similar facial adornments are prohibited, unless medically
indicated."
2 7 0
"Male offenders are allowed to grow facial hair. Facial hair
must remain neatly trimmed, clean, and cannot exceed one-
half inch (h') in length." 27 1
"Moustaches, sideburns and beards must be neat and clean
and of reasonable length and style. Beards shall not extend
below the chin more than three (3) inches and no more than
one and one-half (1 '1h) inches in length and growth on the
side of the face."
2 7 2
269. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 33-602.101(4) (Care of Inmates).
270. GA. Comp. R. & REGS. 125-2-3-.04(6) (Personal Hygiene).
271. IDAHO DEPT OF CORR., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, DIvIsION OF PRISONS,
INMATE MANAGEMENT: HYGIENE OF OFFENDERS, OFFENDER BARBERS, AND FACILITY
HOUSEKEEPING, No. 306.02.01.001 § (5) (2008), available at http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/sites/
default/files/webfm/documents/about us/policies-andforms/policypublic/3060201001.pdf.
272. IND. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, MANUAL OF POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES: OFFENDER GROOMING, CLOTHING, AND PERSONAL HYGIENE, No. 02-01-104
§ (IV) (2010) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-01-104_3-10-
I0.pdf.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
7. Louisiana (39,780)
8. Mississippi (21,521)
9. South Carolina (24,091)
10. Texas (171,249)
11. Virginia (38,081)
"An offender's appearance and hair style or length not con-
flict with institutional requirements for security, safety,
identification and hygiene. These are valid penological
goals . . . .We control the length of the offender's hair n
order to accomplish safety of offenders, volunteers and
staff. We do not make religious exceptions nor allow
offenders to wear their hair at the length they choose. We
require they keep it short, but not shaved or military
style." 273
"Male inmate's hair will be kept clean and neatly cut so the
hair does not fall below the collar and is not more than 3" in
length. Mustaches will be neatly trimmed at all times.
Beards and goatees in excess of 'h" are not permitted for
identification purposes."274
"Inmates must be clean shaven and no inmate will be per-
mitted to wear a beard, sideburns, goatee, etc. A mustache
is authorized; however, it must be neatly trimmed and must
not extend beyond the corner of the mouth or extend over
the lip. 'No shave' passes are not authorized." 275
"Male offenders must be clean-shaven. No beards, mus-
taches or hair under the lip will be allowed." 276
"Male offenders' hair will be neatly cut no longer than
above the shirt collar and around the ears. Sideburns will
not extend below the middle of the ear. Hair will not be
more than one inch in thickness or depth." 277
* - States in the Eleventh Circuit are italicized
273. Klemm, supra note 161, at 9-10.
274. Miss. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
REGULATIONS, Ch. VI § IV(D)(1) (2009), available at http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/Inmate
Handbook/CHAPTER%20VI.pdf.
275. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE GROOMING STANDARDS, SCDC POLICY/PROCEDURE, No.
OP-22.13 (2006).
276. TEX. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST., OFFENDER ORIENTATION HANDBOOK § (III)(A)(3) (2004),
available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/publications/cid/OffendOrientHbkNov04.pdf.
277. VA. DEP'T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE: OFFENDER GROOMING AND HYGIENE, No.
864.1 § (VI)(B)(l)-(3) (2010) (citing ACA 4-4283), available at http://www.vadoc.virginia.gov/
about/procedures/documents/800/864- I.pdf.
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